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BRING  ULYSSES  TO  FLORIDA:  PROPOSED  
LEGISLATIVE  RELIEF  FOR  MENTAL  HEALTH  
PATIENTS  
Judy  Ann  Clausen*  
This  Article  urges  the  Florida  legislature  to  give  patients  the  right  to  form  
Ulysses  arrangements,  which  are  a  special   type  of  mental  health  advance  
directive   authorizing   a   doctor   to   administer   treatment   during   a   future  
episode   even   if   the   episode  causes   the  patient   to   refuse   treatment.     Acute  
mental   illness   episodes   may   disrupt   a   patient’s   capacity   to   provide  
informed   consent   and   cause   the   patient   to   refuse  necessary   intervention.    
In  Florida,  a  physician  cannot  involuntarily  examine,  hospitalize,  or  treat  
a  person  unless  she  meets  strict  criteria,  essentially  requiring  the  person’s  
behavior  to  reveal  that  she  is  dangerous  to  herself  or  others.    Even  a  person  
exhibiting   signs   of   psychosis   and   clearly   in   need   of   treatment   may   not  
meet  such  strict  criteria.    In  such  cases,  intervention  is  postponed  until  the  
person  becomes  dangerous.      In   the  meantime,   the  untreated   episode  may  
damage   the   person’s   relationships,   savings,   employment,   safety,   and  
mental   and   physical   health.      This   Article   explores   how   Florida   law  
deprives  patients  of  the  ability  to  form  Ulysses  arrangements.    It  proposes  
legislative   relief   for   Florida’s   mental   health   patients,   which   authorizes  
Ulysses   arrangements.      One   novel   component   of   this   legislative   relief  
provides  patients  the  option  to  arrange  for  involuntary  transportation  to  a  
hospital.     Episodes  which   cause   treatment   refusals   also   cause   patients   to  
refuse   transportation   to   a   hospital.      If   a   patient   is   unable   to   obtain  
transportation  in  contravention  of  refusals,  she  cannot  secure  intervention  
through  her  Ulysses  arrangement.  
* Asociate  Professor  of  Law,  Florida  Coastal  School  of  Law,  B.A.,  Georgetown
University,  1992;  J.D.,  University  of  Florida,  1995.  The  author  would  like  to  thank  
her  father,  Dr.  Benjamin  Lacy.  
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Acute   mental   illness   episodes   may   temporarily   destroy   the  
capacity   required   to   provide   informed   consent,   prevent  
individuals   from   recognizing   they   are   sick,   and   cause   them   to  
refuse  necessary  intervention.1    Even  in  the  midst  of  an  episode,  
which   has   disrupted   behavior   and   cognitive   functions,   many  
people  do  not  meet   the  Florida  Mental  Health  Act’s   (otherwise  
 
   1.     KAY  REDFIELD  JAMISON,  AN  UNQUIET  MIND:  A  MEMOIR  OF  MOODS  AND  
MADNESS  36-­‐‑38  (1995);  Joanmarie  I.  Davoli,  Still  Stuck  in  the  Cuckoo'ʹs  Nest:  Why  Do  
Courts  Continue  to  Rely  on  Antiquated  Mental  Illness  Research?,  69  TENN.  L.  REV.  987,  
1009  (2002);  Nat'ʹl.  Ethics  Comm’n.,  Veterans  Health  Admin.,  Advance  Directives  for  
Mental  Health:  An  Ethical  Analysis  of  State  Laws  &  Implications  for  VHA  Policy,  Nat'ʹl.  
Center  for  Ethics  in  Healthcare,  US  Dep'ʹt.  Veterans  Aff.  8  (Feb.  2008),  
http://www.ethics.va.gov/docs/NEC_Report_20080220_Adv_Directives_MH-­‐‑
Analysis_of_State_Laws-­‐‑Implications_for_VHA_Policy.pdf  [hereinafter  VHA  
Report];  Judy  Clausen,  Making  the  Case  for  a  Model  Mental  Health  Advance  Directive  
Statute,  14  Yale  J.  Health  Pol'ʹy.,  L.,  &  Ethics  1,  3-­‐‑4  (2014)  (describing  the  illness  
induced  treatment  refusal  phenomena  and  arguing  the  Uniform  Health-­‐‑Care  
Decisions  Act  fails  people  with  mental  illness  for  many  reasons,  including  by  
depriving  them  of  the  right  to  form  Ulysses  arrangements).  
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known   as   the   Baker   Act)   strict   criteria   for   involuntary  
evaluation,  hospitalization,  and  treatment.2    Once  an  episode  has  
destroyed   decision-­‐‑making   capacity   and   caused   treatment  
refusals,   the   only   hope   for   intervention   is   through   involuntary  
commitment,   which   the   Baker   Act   calls   involuntary   inpatient  
placement.3    This  is  initiated  through  involuntary  examination,  a  
psychiatric   examination   conducted   without   the   person’s  
consent.4    Under  the  Baker  Act,  a  physician  cannot  involuntarily  
examine   a   person   unless   the   person   meets   strict   criteria,  
essentially   requiring   the  person’s  behavior   to   reveal   that   she   is  
dangerous  to  herself  or  others.5     Even  a  person  exhibiting  signs  
of   psychosis,   and   clearly   in   need   of   treatment,   may   not   meet  
involuntary  examination  criteria.6     In  such  cases,  intervention  is  
postponed   until   the   person   becomes   dangerous.7      In   the  
meantime,   the   untreated   episode   may   damage   the   person’s  
relationships,   savings,   employment,   safety,   and   mental   and  
physical  health.8  
 
   2.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.467(1)  (2013)  (Involuntary  inpatient  placement  criteria);  
FLA.  STAT.  §  394.4655(1)  (2013)  (Involuntary  outpatient  placement  criteria);  FLA.  
STAT.  §394.463(1)  (2013)  (Involuntary  examination  criteria).  
   3.     FLA.  STAT.  §§  394.467(1)  (2013);  394.4655(1)  (2013);  Breanna  M.  Sheetz,  
Comment,  The  Choice  to  Limit  Choice:  Using  Psychiatric  Advance  Directives  to  Manage  
the  Effects  of  Mental  Illness  and  Support  Responsibility,  40  U.  MICH.  J.  L.  REFORM  401,  
415  (2007).  
   4.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.463  (2013);  FLA'ʹS  BAKER  ACT:  2013  FACT  SHEET  DEP’T  OF  
CHILDREN  AND  FAMILIES,  
http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/programs/samh/mentalhealth/docs/Baker%20Act%20Ove
rview%202013.pdf.  [hereinafter  DCF  Fact  Sheet].  
   5.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.463  (2013).  
   6.     Id.    (This  is  because  even  if  the  person  exhibits  signs  of  psychosis  there  may  
not  be  a  substantial  likelihood  that  “without  care  .  .  .  the  person  will  cause  serious  
bodily  harm  to  .  .  .  herself  or  others  in  the  near  future,  as  evidenced  by  recent  
behavior.”    Or,  alternatively,  “[w]ithout  care  .  .  .  the  person  would  be  likely  to  
suffer  from  neglect  or  refuse  to  care  for  .  .  .  herself  .  .  .  [and  that]  such  neglect  .  .  .  
poses  a  real  and  present  threat  of  substantial  harm  to  [the  person'ʹs]  well-­‐‑being).  
   7.     Id.  
   8.     See  Tuten  v.  Fariborzian,  84  So.3d  1063,  1065  (Fla.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  2012)  
(wrongful  death  action  concerning  a  patient  released  after  attempted  suicide  
because  he  no  longer  met  involuntary  placement  criteria,  and  the  day  after  release  
shot  his  wife  and  then  fatally  shot  himself);  Nick  Anderson,  Dr.  Jekyll'ʹs  Waiver  of  
Mr.  Hyde'ʹs  Right  to  Refuse  Medical  Treatment:  Washington'ʹs  New  Law  Authorizing  
Mental  Healthcare  Advance  Directives  Needs  Additional  Protections,  78  WASH.  L.  REV.  
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This  Article  urges  Florida  to  give  mental  health  patients  the  
right   to   form   and   effectuate   Ulysses   arrangements.      This  
arrangement   derives   its   name   from   the   Odyssey.9      Concerned  
the   Sirens’   song  would   lead   him   into   danger,  Ulysses   directed  
his   shipmates   to   tie   him   to   the  mast   of   his   ship   to  protect   him  
even   if   the   song   compelled   him   to   demand   to   be   set   free.10     A  
patient   forms   a   Ulysses   arrangement   when   she   has   capacity.11    
Through   the   arrangement,   the   patient   authorizes   doctors   to  
administer   treatment   during   a   future   episode   even   in  
contravention  of   the  patient’s   illness-­‐‑induced  refusals  and  even  
if   the   patient   lacks   capacity   to   provide   informed   consent.12    
Patients   who   form   Ulysses   arrangements   have   experienced  
previous   episodes   and   have   learned   that   such   episodes   cause  
them   to   refuse   treatment.13      Florida’s   statute   governing   all  
advance  health  care  planning  (Florida’s  generic  directive  statute)  
primarily   addresses   planning   for   end-­‐‑of-­‐‑life   care   instead   of  
treatment   for   acute  mental   illness   episodes.14      Florida’s   generic  
directive   statute   does   not   enable   patients   to   form   Ulysses  
arrangements.15  
 
795,  801  (2003);  Davoli,  supra  note  1,  at  1045  (citing  Ashok  K.  Malla  et  al.,  Improving  
Outcomes  in  Schizophrenia:  The  Case  for  Early  Intervention,  160  CAN.  MED.  ASS'ʹN  J.  843,  
844  (1999)  (for  the  statement  that  prompt  intervention  at  the  beginning  of  psychosis  
greatly  improves  the  chances  of  long-­‐‑term  recovery));  Clausen,  supra  note  1,  at  n.  
13.  
   9.     Clausen,  supra  note  1,  at  n.  8;  Chrisoula  Andreou,  Making  a  Clean  Break:  
Addiction  and  Ulysses  Contracts,  22  BIOETHICS  25  (2008);  Theo  Van  Willigenburg  &  
Patrick  J.J.  Delaere,  Protecting  Autonomy  as  Authenticity  Using  Ulysses  Contracts,  30  J.  
MED.  &  PHIL.  395,  396  (2005).  
   10.     Andreou,  supra  note  9,  at  25.  
   11.     I.  Gremmen  et  al.,  Ulysses  Arrangements  in  Psychiatry:  A  Matter  of  Good  
Care?,  34  J.  MED.  ETHICS  77  (2008).  
   12.     Sheetz,  supra  note  3,  at  403-­‐‑404.  
   13.     Elizabeth  M.  Gallagher,  Advance  Directives  for  Psychiatric  Care:  A  Theoretical  
and  Practical  Overview  for  Legal  Professionals,  4  PSYCHOL.  PUB.  POL’Y  &  L.  746,  780  
(1998).  
   14.     FLA.  STAT.  §  765.102  (3)-­‐‑(5)  (2013)  (legislative  findings  addressing  life-­‐‑
prolonging  medical  procedures,  end-­‐‑of-­‐‑life  and  palliative  care,  pain  management,  
and  the  creation  of  a  campaign  on  end-­‐‑of-­‐‑life  care  for  educating  the  public,  but  
failing  to  address  mental  health  treatments).  
   15.     FLA.  STAT.  §  765.104(1)  (2013)  (allowing  revocation  of  advance  directives  or  
designations  of  surrogates  by  competent  principals  only.    If  not  given  a  choice  
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Part   I   explains   the   legal   and   clinical   context   for   Ulysses  
arrangements.      It   explores   the   Baker   Act,   which   governs  
involuntary   examination,   detention,   transportation,  
hospitalization,  and  treatment  of  mental  health  patients.16    Part  I  
argues   that  a  Ulysses  arrangement   intervention   is  preferable   to  
involuntary  placement   for  patients,   and   for  Florida,   for   several  
reasons.      Ulysses   arrangement   intervention   is   more   timely,  
effective,   and   therapeutic   than   involuntary   placement.    
Intervention   through   a   Ulysses   arrangement   is   less   time-­‐‑
consuming,   traumatic,   and   intrusive   than   involuntary  
placement.     Moreover,  Ulysses  arrangements  empower  patients  
to   avoid   dehumanizing   commitment   and   guardianship  
proceedings.      These   arrangements   also   potentially   preserve  
scarce  judicial  and  public  defender  resources  and  facilitate  more  
cost-­‐‑effective   intervention  than  involuntary  placement.     Finally,  
Ulysses   arrangements   are   a   needed   alternative   to   involuntary  
placement  because  in  Florida,  which  ranks  as  one  of  the  lowest  
states   in   mental   health   spending,   there   is   a   shortage   of  
psychiatric  hospital  beds.  
Part   II   illustrates   several   reasons   why   Florida’s   generic  
directive   statute   is   not   a   Ulysses   enabling   statute.      First,   the  
generic   directive   statute   does   not   enable   patients   to   determine  
whether  their  directives  are  revocable  when  they  lack  capacity.17    
Second,  the  statute  fails  to  provide  safeguards  to  ensure  Ulysses  
arrangements   are   formed   knowingly   and   voluntarily.18      Third,  
the   statute   provides   no   authority   and   no   process   for  
administering   treatment   in   the   face   of   contemporaneous  
refusals.19      Finally,   patients   have   no  mechanism   to   arrange   for  
involuntary   transportation   to   a   facility   to   obtain   intervention  
pursuant  to  a  Ulysses  arrangement.20  
 
about  revocability,  a  patient  cannot  form  a  Ulysses  arrangement).  
   16.     FLA.  STAT.,  ch.  394  (2013).  
   17.     FLA.  STAT.  §  765.104(1)  (2013).  
   18.     See  generally,  FLA.  STAT.,  ch.  765  (2013).  
   19.     Id.  
   20.     Id.  
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Part   III  describes  a  Ulysses  enabling  statute  Florida  should  
adopt  by  amending  both  the  Baker  Act  and  the  generic  directive  
statute.      The   described   statute   ensures   patients   form   Ulysses  
arrangements   knowingly   and   voluntarily   because   it   (1)  
empowers   patients   to   decide   whether   they   can   revoke   their  
arrangements,   (2)   requires   a   signed   and  witnessed  writing,   (3)  
mandates   a   capacity   assessment   and   attestation,   and   (4)  
provides   for   automatic   expiration   of   arrangements.     Moreover,  
the  described  statute  defines  a  process  for  Ulysses  arrangement  
implementation   through   authorizing   patient   designated  
activation   and   involuntary   transportation   to   a   facility.      The  
involuntary   transportation   option   is   novel   and   necessary.    
Patients  whose  illnesses  cause  them  to  refuse  treatment  will  also  
refuse   transportation   to   a   hospital.      If   the   patient   is   unable   to  
obtain  transportation  in  contravention  of  refusals,   the  patient   is  
unable  to  secure  intervention  through  her  Ulysses  arrangement.    
Finally,   the   described   statute   articulates   procedures   for  
admission,   retention,   and   treatment   pursuant   to   a   Ulysses  
arrangement.  
I.  ULYSSES  ARRANGEMENTS  IN  CONTEXT  
This   Section   explores   the   legal   and   clinical   context   for  Ulysses  
arrangements  in  Florida.    Then,  it  explores  key  provisions  of  the  
Baker  Act  and  explains  why  Ulysses  arrangement  intervention  is  
superior  to  involuntary  commitment  for  most  patients.  
A.  THE  CLINICAL  AND  LEGAL  CONTEXT  
In  its  legislative  findings,  Florida’s  generic  directive  statute  
states,   “[E]very   competent   adult   has   the   fundamental   right   of  
self-­‐‑determination   regarding   [her   health   care   decisions]  
including   the   right   to   choose   or   refuse  .  .  .   treatment.”21      To  
ensure  patients  do  not  lose  this  right  because  of  later  incapacity,  
 
   21.     FLA.  STAT.  §  765.102(1)  (2013).  
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the  statute  sets  forth  a  process  allowing  patients  to  create  health  
care   advance   directives.22      The   legislative   findings   assert   that  
establishing  an  advance  directive   should  be   less  expensive  and  
restrictive   than   guardianship,   and   should   permit   previously  
incapacitated   people   to   exercise   full   control   over   their   health  
care  decisions  as  soon  as  capacity  is  restored.23  
In   many   jurisdictions,   competence   is   distinguished   from  
capacity   because   a   court   determines   incompetence,   but   a  
physician   determines   incapacity.24      However,   Florida’s   generic  
directive   statute   does   not   make   this   distinction,   rather   the  
statute   uses   competence   and   capacity   interchangeably,   as   will  
this  Article.25      The   generic   directive   statute   states:   “‘Incapacity’  
or   ‘incompetent,’   means   the   patient   is   physically   or   mentally  
unable   to   communicate   a   willful   and   knowing   health   care  
decision.”26    The  statute  defines  informed  consent  as  follows:  
‘Informed  consent’  means  consent  voluntarily  given  by  
a  person  after  a  sufficient  explanation  and  disclosure  of  
the   subject   matter   involved   to   enable   that   person   to  
have   a   general   understanding   of   the   treatment   or  
procedure   and   the   medically   acceptable   alternatives,  
including  the  substantial  risks  and  hazards  inherent  in  
the  proposed   treatment   or   procedures,   and   to  make   a  
knowing   health   care   decision   without   coercion   or  
undue  influence.27  
Advance  directives  come  in  different  forms.28    Patients  (also  
referred   to  as  principals)  use   instructional  directives   to  consent  
 
   22.     FLA.  STAT.  §  765.102(2)  (2013).  
   23.     Id.  
   24.     Jessica  Wilen  Berg  et  al.,  Constructing  Competence:  Formulating  Standards  of  
Legal  Competence  to  Make  Medical  Decisions,  48  RUTGERS  L.  REV.  345,  348-­‐‑49  (1996);  
Sheetz,  supra  note  3,  at  415.  
   25.     FLA.  STAT.  §  765.101(8)  (2013).  
   26.     Id.  
   27.     FLA.  STAT.  §  765.101(9)  (2013).  
   28.     Justine  A.  Dunlap,  Mental  Health  Advance  Directives:  Having  One'ʹs  Say,  89  
KY.  L.J.  327,  347-­‐‑51  (2001).  
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to  or  refuse  care  to  be  provided  when  the  patient  lacks  capacity  
to   consent.29      The   Florida   generic   directive   statute   regulates  
instructional  directives  through  its  provisions  concerning  living  
wills.30    It  is  difficult  for  a  patient  to  anticipate  all  circumstances  
that   may   arise   when   illness   or   injury   has   destroyed   capacity.    
Therefore,  proxy  directives  allow  patients  to  appoint  surrogates  
to  make  decisions  for  the  patient  when  the  patient  lacks  capacity  
to  provide   informed  consent.31     The  patient   can   then  engage   in  
ongoing   dialogue   with   her   surrogate   to   ensure   her   surrogate  
understands   her   thoughts   concerning   treatment.32      Florida’s  
generic   directive   statute   regulates   proxy   directives   through  
provisions  in  Part  II,  which  is  entitled  “Health  Care  Surrogate.”33    
Hybrid   directives   enable   patients   to   give   instructions   and  
designate   surrogates   to   make   decisions   in   line   with   patient  
values   when   situations   arise   that   instructions   fail   to   address.34    
Both  general  advance  directives  (generic  directives)  and  mental  
health  advance  directives   (mental  health  directives)  come   in  all  
of   these   forms.35     Typically,  doctors   follow  generic  directives  at  
the   end   of   the   patient’s   life.36      Generic   directives   address   such  
issues  as  whether  to  cease  life-­‐‑sustaining  treatment  when  illness  
or  injury  has  caused  the  patient  to  enter  a  permanent  vegetative  
state.37      Doctors   often   implement   generic   directives   when   the  
 
   29.     John  Q.  La  Fond  &  Debra  Srebnik,  The  Impact  of  Mental  Health  Advance  
Directives  on  Patient  Perceptions  of  Coercion  in  Civil  Commitment  and  Treatment  
Decisions,  25  INT'ʹL  J.L.  &  PSYCHIATRY  537,  537-­‐‑38  (2002).  
   30.     FLA.  STAT.  §§  765.301-­‐‑765.305  (2013).  
   31.     Karl  A.  Menninger,  Advance  Directives  for  Medical  and  Psychiatric  Care,  102  
AM.  JUR.  PROOF  OF  FACTS  3d  95,  §25  (2008).  
   32.     Id.  
   33.     FLA.  STAT.  §§  765.201-­‐‑765.205  (2013).  
   34.     Menninger,  supra  note  31,  at  §7,  §25.  
   35.     Id.  
   36.   Contra  Patricia  Backlar,  Anticipatory  Planning  for  Psychiatric  Treatment  is  Not  
Quite  the  Same  as  Planning  for  End-­‐‑of-­‐‑life  Care,  33  CMTY.  MENTAL  HEALTH  J.  261,  262  
(1997).  
   37.     FLA.  STAT.  §§  765.301-­‐‑765.309  (2013)  (Florida'ʹs  generic  directive  statute  
provisions  on  life  prolonging  procedures  concerning  such  things  as  mercy  killing  or  
euthanasia  not  being  authorized,  suicide  being  distinguished).  
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patient  lacks  capacity  because  she  is  in  a  coma.38  
The   mental   health   context   is   different.      Mental   health  
directives   enable   patients   to   author   intervention   plans   to   be  
followed   each   time   the   patient   suffers   an   acute   episode.39    
Patients  may  use  mental  health  directives  to  refuse  or  consent  to  
mental   health   treatments   such   as   electroconvulsive   therapy,  
psychotropic  medication,   or   inpatient   treatment.40      The  mental  
health   directive   documents   the   patient’s   informed   consent,  
enabling   her   doctor   to   intervene   during   an   episode   that   has  
destroyed  capacity.41  
Episodes   of   many   mental   illnesses   not   only   temporarily  
disrupt   patient   capacity,   these   episodes   prevent   patients   from  
realizing  they  are  sick  and  cause  patients  to  refuse  treatment  to  
which  they  would  otherwise  consent.42    For  example,  in  Paddock  
v.   Chacko,   the   plaintiff’s   husband   drove   her   to   the   hospital,  
where  she  stayed  for  two  days,  following  an  attempt  to  take  her  
own   life.43     Her   treating   psychiatrist   determined   an   episode   of  
paranoid   psychosis   caused   her   suicide   attempt.44      He  
recommended   she   be   hospitalized   because   she   was   at   risk   for  
another   suicide   attempt.45     Under   the   influence   of   the   episode,  
she   was   unable   to   appreciate   her   need   for   treatment,   did   not  
follow  her  psychiatrist’s  advice,  and  was  discharged.46    Within  a  
month,   she   again   attempted   suicide   and   sustained   permanent  
injuries.47  
Once   a   patient   refuses   treatment,   her   physician   cannot  
 
   38.     David  Y.  Nakashima,  Comment,  Your  Body,  Your  Choice:  How  Mandatory  
Advance  Health-­‐‑Care  Directives  are  Necessary  to  Protect  Your  Fundamental  Right  to  
Accept  or  Refuse  Medical  Treatment,  27  U.  HAW.  L.  REV.  201,  203  (2004).  
   39.     Sheetz,  supra  note  3,  at  403.  
   40.     Menninger,  supra  note  31,  at  §25.  
   41.     Backlar,  supra  note  36,  at  265.  
   42.     Jamison,  supra  note  1,  at  37;  Davoli,  supra  note  1,  at  1009;  VHA  Report,  
supra  note  1,  8;  Clausen,  supra  note  1,  at  3-­‐‑5.  
   43.     Paddock  v.  Chacko,  522  So.2d  410,  412  (Fla.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  1988).  
   44.     Id.  
   45.     Id.  
   46.     Id.  
   47.     Id.  at  413.  
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hospitalize   or   treat   her   unless   she   meets   the   strict   criteria   for  
involuntary  placement.48    By  the  time  the  patient  meets  the  strict  
criteria,   the   episode  may   have  wreaked   havoc   on   the   patient’s  
life.49      Untreated   episodes   may   destroy   the   patient’s   career,  
relationships,  and  financial  stability;   lead  to  incarceration  and  a  
criminal   record;   and   risk   the   patient’s   and   others’   health   and  
safety.50  
Ulysses   arrangements   provide   patients   a   tool   to   secure  
intervention  when  an  episode  causes  them  to  refuse  treatment.51    
The   patient   forms   the   arrangement,   which   is   a   special   type   of  
irrevocable  mental  health  directive,  when  she  has  full  capacity.52    
Through   the   arrangement,   the   patient   authorizes   doctors   to  
administer   treatment   during   a   future   episode   even   in  
contravention  of   the  patient’s  contemporaneous   illness-­‐‑induced  
refusals.53      Patients   who   form   Ulysses   arrangements   have  
experienced  previous   episodes   and   know   from   experience   that  
episodes  cause  them  to  refuse  treatment.54  
B.  ULYSSES  ARRANGEMENT  INTERVENTION  SUPERIOR  TO  
INVOLUNTARY  PLACEMENT  
Without   Ulysses   arrangements,   Florida   mental   health  
patients   face   tremendous   obstacles   to   obtaining   intervention  
when   an   episode   temporarily   destroys   capacity   and   causes  
treatment   refusals.55      This   Section   explores   involuntary  
 
   48.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.463(1)  (2013).  
   49.     See,  e.g.,  Garcia  v.  Lifemark  Hosp.  of  Fla.,  754  So.2d  48,  48-­‐‑49  (Fla.  Dist.  Ct.  
App.  2000)  (wrongful  death  action  against  hospital  which  released  mental  health  
patient  against  medical  advice  and  patient  later  committed  suicide).  
   50.     See,  e.g.,  Santa  Cruz  v.  Nw.  Dade  Cmty.  Health  Ctr.,  Inc.,  590  So.2d  444,  
444-­‐‑45  (Fla.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  1992)  (persons  who  were  shot  by  mental  health  patient  
brought  action  against  mental  health  center  which  did  not  detain  patient).  
   51.     Andreou,  supra  note  9,  at  25.  
   52.     Gremmen,  supra  note  11,  at  77.  
   53.     Andreou,  supra  note  9,  at  25.  
   54.     Gallagher,  supra  note  13,  at  780.  
   55.     See  FLA.  STAT.  §  394.463(1)  (2013)  (revealing  that  a  non-­‐‑consenting  patient  
cannot  even  be  evaluated  for  her  need  for  treatment  unless  she  meets  involuntary  
examination  criteria).  
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outpatient   and   inpatient   placement   in   Florida   because   the  
primary   way   a   person   obtains   treatment,   when   an   episode  
causes   treatment   refusals,   is   through   involuntary   placement.56    
The   text   below   explains   why   intervention   through   a   Ulysses  
arrangement   respects   patient   autonomy   and   dignity,   secures  
timely   and   effective   treatment,   and   protects   patient   safety   far  
more   than   involuntary   placement.      Moreover,   intervention  
through  Ulysses   arrangements   is   far   less   expensive   for   Florida  
and  for  patients,  and  less  traumatic  for  patients  than  involuntary  
placement.  
1. The  Baker  Act  
The   Florida   Mental   Health   Act,   also   known   as   the   Baker  
Act,   protects   the   rights   of   all   people   examined   or   treated   for  
mental   illness   in   Florida   and   governs   civil   commitment.57      The  
text   below   explores   the   Baker   Act   criteria   and   procedures   for  
involuntary   detention,   transportation,   examination,   and  
involuntary  inpatient  and  outpatient  placement.58     “Involuntary  
inpatient   placement   .   .   .   is   the   Baker   Act’s   term   for   civil  
commitment.”59      Therefore,   this   Article   will   use   “civil  
commitment”   and   “involuntary   placement”   interchangeably.    
“[O]utpatient  placement  .  .  .  is  a  form  of  commitment  that  allows  
individuals  to  be  mandated  by  the  court  to  receive  mental  health  
treatment   on   an   outpatient   basis.”60      This   Section   posits   that  
Ulysses  arrangements  are  superior  to  commitment,  which  often  
comes   too   late   and   is   traumatic.61                                                                                          
Moreover,   commitment   proceedings   are   dehumanizing.    
Additionally,   state  mental  health  hospitals   are   closing.62     There  
 
   56.     FLA.  STAT.  §§  394.4655,  394.467  (2013);  Sheetz,  supra  note  3,  at  415.  
   57.     See  DCF  Fact  Sheet,  supra  note  4.  
   58.     FLA.  STAT.  ch.  394  (2013).  
   59.     DCF  Fact  Sheet,  supra  note  4.    
   60.     Id.  
   61.     See  infra  Part  I.B.  
   62.     Paul  S.  Appelbaum,  The  ‘Quiet’  Crisis  in  Mental  Health  Services,  22  HEALTH  
AFFAIRS  110,  115  (2003).  
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are  an  insufficient  number  of  beds  to  support  patients.63    Ulysses  
arrangements   potentially   preserve   scarce   resources   by  
empowering   patients   to   author   their   own   stabilization   plans,  
thereby  avoiding  longer-­‐‑term  hospitalization.  
a.  Involuntary  Examination  Criteria  
Once   an   episode   has   destroyed   capacity   and   caused  
treatment   refusals,   the   best   hope   for   intervention   is   through  
involuntary  inpatient  or  outpatient  placement,  initiated  through  
an  involuntary  examination.64    “An  involuntary  exam[ination]  is  
a   psychiatric   exam[ination]   conducted   without   [the   patient’s]  
consent,   often   [referred   to   as]   ‘getting   Baker   Acted.’”65      The  
Baker   Act   authorizes   law   enforcement   officers   to   detain   and  
transport   a  person  who  meets   involuntary   examination   criteria  
as   evidenced   by   one   of   three   forms   of   documentation:   (1)   the  
officer’s  personal  recorded  observations,  (2)  an  ex  parte  order  of  
the   court,   or   (3)   a   physician’s   certificate.66      In   2013,   law  
enforcement   officers   initiated   approximately   49%,   physicians  
initiated   approximately   49%,   and   circuit   court   ex   parte   orders  
initiated   approximately   2%   of   involuntary   detentions   for   the  
purposes  of  involuntary  examination.67  
Involuntary   examination   criteria   reflect   the   two   forms   of  
civil  commitment:  police  power  and  parens  patriae  commitment.68    
The  state’s  police  power  refers  to  its  authority  to  maintain  peace  
and   order,   and   therefore   confine   a   person   who   is   likely   to   be  
dangerous   to   others.69      Under   the   state’s   police   power,   police  
may  detain  and  transport  a  person  for  involuntary  examination  
if   there   is   reason   to  believe  she  has  a  mental   illness,  defined  as  
 
   63.     Sheetz,  supra  note  3,  at  415.  
   64.     Id.  
   65.     DCF  Fact  Sheet,  supra  note  4.    
   66.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.463(2)  (2013).  
   67.     DCF  Fact  Sheet,  supra  note  4.    
   68.     Addington  v.  Texas,  441  U.S.  418,  426  (1979).  
   69.     Id.  
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“impairment  of   the  mental  or  emotional  processes   that  exercise  
conscious  control   [over   the  person’s]  actions  or  of   the  ability   to  
perceive  or  understand  reality,  which   impairment   substantially  
interferes   with   the   person’s   ability   to   meet   the   ordinary  
demands   of   living.”70      Moreover,   there  must   be   a   “substantial  
likelihood   that   without  .  .  .   treatment   the   person   will   cause  
serious  bodily  harm  to  .  .  .  herself  or  others  in  the  near  future,  as  
evidenced   by   recent   behavior”   (police   power   examination  
criteria).71  
Parens   patriae   authority   allows   Florida   to   protect   a   person  
whose  mental  illness  prevents  her  from  being  able  to  care  for  her  
basic   needs.72      For   involuntary   examination   based   on   parens  
patriae  authority,  there  must  be  reason  to  believe  the  person  has  
a   mental   illness   which   has   either   caused   her   to   refuse  
involuntary  examination  after  an  explanation  of   the  purpose  of  
examination,   or   the   person   is   unable   to   determine   for   herself  
whether  examination  is  necessary.73    Next,  “without  care  .  .  .  the  
person   [must   be]   likely   to   suffer   from  neglect   or   refuse   to   care  
for  .  .  .   herself;   such   neglect   or   refusal   [must   pose]   a   real   and  
present   threat   of   substantial   harm   to  .  .  .   her   well-­‐‑being.”74    
Moreover,  it  must  not  be  apparent  that  willing  family  or  friends  
or   the   provision   of   other   services   can   avoid   the   harm   (parens  
patriae  examination  criteria).75    Together,  parens  patriae  and  police  
power   examination   criteria   will   be   referred   to   as:   involuntary  
examination  criteria.  
These   strict   examination   criteria   prevent  many   patients   in  
the   midst   of   a   mental   health   crisis   from   receiving   necessary  
intervention.     A   common   scenario   involves   a   concerned   family  
member  who  contacts   law  enforcement  to  report  a  loved  one  is  
in  the  midst  of  an  episode.     Even  if  the  person  exhibits  signs  of  
 
   70.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.455(18)  (2013).  
   71.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.463(2)  (2013).  
   72.     Addington,  441  U.S.  418,  426  (1979).  
   73.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.463(1)  (2013).  
   74.     Id.  
   75.     Id.  
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psychosis,   if   the   person   refuses   to   go   to   the   hospital,   officers  
cannot  detain  and  transport  the  person  unless  the  person  meets  
the   strict   criteria.76      Evidence   of   psychosis   alone   does   not  
necessarily  meet  police  power  examination  criteria.77    There  may  
be   insufficient   evidence   that   there   is   “a   substantial   likelihood  
that  without  .  .  .   treatment   the  person  will   cause   serious   bodily  
harm   to   himself  .  .  .   or   others  .  .  .   evidenced   by   recent  
behavior.”78      The   person   in   the   midst   of   an   episode   that   has  
caused  psychosis  may   also  not  meet  parens   patriae   examination  
criteria.79     There  may  be   insufficient  evidence   that  without  care  
the   person   is   likely   to   suffer   from   neglect   to   such   an   extent   it  
poses   a   present   threat   of   substantial   harm   to   her   well-­‐‑being.80    
Left   untreated,   the   person’s   cognitive   functions   will   likely  
continue  to  deteriorate,  and  loved  ones  will  be  unable  to  help.81  
b.  Detention  &  Transportation  
Each   county   must   designate   a   single   law   enforcement  
agency   responsible   for   taking   a   person   into   custody   for   the  
purposes   of   transporting   the   person   for   involuntary  
examination.82      The   law   enforcement   agency  may   delegate   the  
responsibility  to  transport  the  person  to  a  receiving  facility  only  
in   the   following   circumstances.83      First,   “[t]he   jurisdiction  .  .  .  
[must   have]   contracted   on   an   annual   basis  with   an   emergency  
medical   transport   service   or   private   transport   company  
(transportation   contractor)   for   [the]   transportation   of   [patients]  
to   receiving   facilities.”84      Second,   the   law   enforcement   agency  
and   the   transportation   contractor   must   agree   that   continued  
 
   76.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.463(1)-­‐‑(2)  (2013).  
   77.     Id.  
   78.     Id.  
   79.     Id.  
   80.     Id.  
   81.     Anderson,  supra  note  8,  at  801;  Davoli,  supra  note  1,  at  1045.  
   82.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.462  (1)(a)  (2013).  
   83.     Id.  
   84.     Id.    
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presence  of  law  enforcement  personnel  is  unnecessary  to  protect  
the   safety   of   the  patient   or   others.85      The   jurisdiction  may   seek  
reimbursement   for   transportation   expenses   from   the   patient’s  
insurance   company   or   the   patient.86      The   transportation  
contractor   is   an   independent   contractor   and  must   comply  with  
all   applicable   rules   of   the   law   enforcement   agency.87   This  
contractor   “is   solely   liable   for   the   safe   and   dignified  
transportation  of  the  patient  .  .  .  [and]  must  be  insured  .  .  .  with  
respect  to  the  transportation  of  patients.”88  
When  an  episode  has  taken  hold  for  sufficient  time  to  cause  
the   patient   to   finally   meet   involuntary   examination   criteria,  
police   or   the   transportation   contractor  must   transport   her   to   a  
hospital.89      This   responsibility   is   not   discretionary.90      In  
Pruessman  v.  Dr.  John  T.  McDonald  Foundation,  a  patient  sued  the  
hospital   and   the   City   of   Coral   Gables   based   on   the   patient’s  
alleged   improper  removal   from  the  hospital  and   transportation  
to   a  mental   health   facility   pursuant   to   the   Baker   Act.91      Police  
transported   the  patient   to   the  mental  health   facility  despite   the  
patient’s   refusal   to   leave   the  hospital  and  be   transferred.92     The  
Third   District   Court   of   Appeal   (DCA)   of   Florida   held,   as   a  
matter   of   law,  Coral  Gables  was  not   liable   for  police  detaining  
and  transporting  a  patient  to  a  mental  health  facility  based  on  a  
facially   valid   certificate   under   the   Baker   Act   executed   by   a  
physician.93      In  fact,  police  had  no  discretion  to  refuse  to  detain  
and   transport   the   patient   upon   the   presentation   of   the   facially  
valid  certificate.94  
 
   85.     Id.    
   86.     Id.    
   87.     Id.  §  394.462(1)(b)-­‐‑(c).  
   88.     Id.  §  394.462(1)(b).  
   89.     Pruessman  v.  Dr.  John  T.  MacDonald  Found.,  589  So.2d  948,  949  (Fla.  Dist.  
Ct.  App.  1991).  
   90.     Id.  
   91.     Id.  at  948-­‐‑49.  
   92.     Id.  at  949.  
   93.     Id.  
   94.     Id.  
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However,   it   is   important   to   remember   police,   physicians,  
and   the   court   cannot   execute   a   valid   Baker   Act   certificate  
authorizing   involuntary   examination   unless   the   patient   meets  
involuntary   examination   criteria.95      As   explored   in   Part   II,  
Florida   patients   are   unable   to   form   Ulysses   arrangements   to  
override   their   illness-­‐‑induced   treatment   refusals.96      Once   an  
episode  causes  the  patient  to  refuse  to  go  to  the  hospital,  no  one  
can   transport   her   unless   she   meets   strict   involuntary  
examination  criteria.97  
c.  Arrival  at  Facility  and  Examination  
The   nearest   receiving   facility   must   accept   for   involuntary  
examination   a   person   brought   by   law   enforcement   or  
transportation   contractors.98      Only   the   Florida   Department   of  
Children  and  Families  designated  Baker  Act  receiving  facilities,  
which   include   hospitals   and   crisis   stabilization   units,   can  
conduct  involuntary  examinations.99    Once  the  person  arrives  at  
the   facility,  a  doctor   shall   examine   the  patient  without  delay.100    
A   physician   may   administer   emergency   treatment   if   the  
physician  determines  such   treatment   is  necessary   for   the  safety  
of  the  patient  or  others.101    These  services  focus  on  stabilizing  the  
immediate  mental  health  crisis.102    The  facility  may  not  hold  the  
patient   for   involuntary   examination   longer   than   seventy-­‐‑two  
hours,  which  begins  when   the  patient   arrives  at   the  hospital.103    
At   the   end   of   seventy-­‐‑two   hours,   the   facility  must   either   offer  
the   person   voluntary   placement,   release   the   person,   return   the  
person   to  police  custody   if   the  person  has  been  charged  with  a  
 
   95.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.463(1)-­‐‑(2)  (2013).  
   96.     See  FLA.  STAT.  §  765.104(1)  (2013).  
   97.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.463(1)-­‐‑(2)  (2013).  
   98.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.462(1)(j)  (2013).  
   99.     DCF  Fact  Sheet,  supra  note  4.  
   100.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.463(2)(f)  (2013).  
   101.     Id.  
   102.     DCF  Fact  Sheet,  supra  note  4.  
   103.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.463(2)(g)  (2013).  
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crime,  or  petition  the  court  for  involuntary  placement.104  
The   average   length   of   stay   in   a   facility   following  
involuntary   examination   is   4.5   days.105      Approximately   76%   of  
all   involuntary   examinations   do   not   result   in   the   filing   of   a  
petition   for   involuntary   placement.106      In   2011,   there   were  
150,000   involuntary   examinations   in   Florida.107      Over   the   ten  
years   between   2002   and   2011,   there  was   an   increase   of   50%   in  
involuntary   examinations   in   Florida.108      Therefore,   in   Florida,  
mental   health   crisis   situations   are   on   the   rise.109      The   vast  
majority  of  people  “Baker  Acted”  are   released   from   the   facility  
after  a   few  days.110     For  many  patients,  a   few  days   intervention  
may   be   sufficient   to   make   the   patient   no   longer   meet  
involuntary   examination   criteria.111      However,   such   short  
intervention   is   often   insufficient   to   restore   the   patient   to   full  
functioning.112     After  only  a  few  days,  many  patients  are  still   in  
the  midst  of   the  episode,  which  will   continue   to   cause   them   to  
refuse   treatment.113      Doctors   are   legally   required   to   heed   their  
illness-­‐‑induced  discharge  demands  despite   the   fact   the  patients  
need   further   treatment.114      After   release,   patients   still   in   the  
midst   of   an   episode   will   continue   to   refuse   treatment;   their  
cognitive  functions  will  continue  to  deteriorate.115    
 
   104.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.463(2)(g)-­‐‑(i)  (2013).  
   105.     DCF  Fact  Sheet,  supra  note  4.    
   106.     Id.  
   107.     Id.  
   108.     Id.  
   109.     Id.  
   110.     Id.  
   111.     See,  e.g.,  Tuten  v.  Fariborzian,  84  So.3d  1063,  1065  (Fla.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  2012)  
(released  because  no  longer  met  involuntary  examination  criteria  then  committed  
suicide).  
   112.     Id.  
   113.     Id.  
   114.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.463(2)(h)-­‐‑(i)  (2013);  Liles  v.  P.I.A.  Medfield,  Inc.,  681  So.2d  
711,  712  (Fla.  Dist.  Ct.  1995)  (holding  a  claim  for  the  tort  of  false  imprisonment  can  
be  asserted  based  on  allegations  a  person  was  involuntarily  held  without  
compliance  with  the  Baker  Act).    
   115.     See  e.g.,  Tuten  v.  Fariborzian,  84  So.3d  1063,  1065  (Fla.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  2012)  
review  denied,  107  So.  3d  407  (Fla.  2012).  
CLAUSEN  (DO  NOT  DELETE)   10/1/15    10:27  AM  
20   MARQUETTE  ELDER’S  ADVISOR   [Vol.  16.1  
 
d.  Voluntary  Placement  Not  Option  
In   Florida,   voluntary   placement   is   not   an   option   for   a  
person   who   does   not   have   capacity   or   whose   illness   induces  
treatment   refusals.116      The   Baker   Act   requires   a   facility117   to  
transfer   to   involuntary   status,   or   discharge,   a   patient   who   is  
unwilling  or  unable  to  provide  express  and  informed  consent  to  
mental   health   treatment.118      The  Baker  Act  defines   express   and  
informed  consent  as  “consent  voluntarily  given  in  writing,  by  a  
competent  person,  after  sufficient  explanation  and  disclosure  of  
the   subject   matter   involved   to   enable   the   person   to   make   a  
knowing   and   willful   decision   without   any   element   of   force,  
fraud,   deceit,   duress,   or   any   form   of   constraint   or   coercion.”119    
Moreover,   the   Baker   Act   prohibits   the   “voluntary”   patient’s  
surrogate   from   consenting   to   the   patient’s   mental   health  
treatment.120  
e.  Involuntary  Inpatient  and  Outpatient  Placement  
i.  Criteria  
Involuntary   commitment   imposes   a   serious   deprivation   of  
individual   liberty,   and   is   only   justified  when   strict   criteria   are  
met.121      In   Florida,   a   person   may   be   placed   in   involuntary  
inpatient   placement   only   upon   a   court’s   finding   by   clear   and  
convincing  evidence   the   following  circumstances  exist.122     First,  
 
   116.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.4625(1)(a)  (2013).  
   117.     The  Baker  Act  defines  facility  as  “any  hospital,  community  facility,  public  
or  private  facility,  or  receiving  or  treatment  facility  providing  for  the  evaluation,  
diagnosis,  care,  treatment,  training,  or  hospitalization  of  persons  who  appear  to  
have  a  mental  illness  or  have  been  diagnosed  as  having  a  mental  illness.”    FLA.  
STAT.  §  394.455(10)  (2013).  
   118.     FLA.  STAT.  §§  394.4625(2)(a),  394.4625(5)  (2013).  
   119.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.455(9)  (2013).  
   120.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.4625(1)(e)  (2013).  
   121.     Humphrey  v.  Cady,  405  U.S.  504,  509  (1972);  Vitek  v.  Jones,  445  U.S.  480,  
490-­‐‑92  (1980);  Zinermon  v.  Burch,  494  U.S.  113,  131  (1990).  
   122.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.467(1)(a)  (2013).  
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the  person   is  mentally   ill.123      Second,  because  of  mental   illness,  
the   person   refused   voluntary   admission   or   is   unable   to  
determine  for  herself  whether  admission   is  necessary.124     Third,  
the   person   meets   either   police   power   or   parens   patriae  
commitment   criteria.125      Fourth,   “All   available   less   restrictive  
treatment   alternatives   which   would   offer   an   opportunity   for  
improvement  .  .  .  have  been  judged  .  .  .  inappropriate.”126  
For  parens  patriae,  the  person  must  be  “manifestly  incapable  
of   surviving   alone   or  with   the   help   of  willing   and   responsible  
family   or   friends,   including   available   alternative   services.”127    
Moreover,  without   treatment,   it  must   be   likely   the   person  will  
suffer  from  neglect  or  refuse  to  care  for  herself.128     Finally,  such  
neglect  must  pose  a  real  and  present  threat  of  substantial  harm  
to   the   person’s   well-­‐‑being.129      For   police   power   commitment,  
there  must   be   a   “substantial   likelihood   that   in   the   near   future  
[the   person]   will   inflict   serious   bodily   harm   on   .   .   .   herself   or  
[others],  as  evidenced  by  recent  behavior.”130  
“Involuntary   outpatient   placement   .   .   .   is   a   form   of  
commitment  [allowing  a  person]  to  be  mandated  by  the  court  to  
receive   mental   health   treatment   on   an   outpatient   basis.”131    
Involuntary   outpatient   placement   is   “used   infrequently   and  
provider   participation   varies.”132      It   is   currently   available   in  
several   Florida   counties.133      Criteria   for   involuntary   outpatient  
placement   “are   more   difficult   to   meet   than   criteria   for  
involuntary   inpatient   placement.”134      A   court   may   only   order  
 
   123.     Id.  
   124.     Id.  
   125.     Id.  
   126.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.467(1)(b)  (2013).  
   127.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.467(1)(a)  (2013).  
   128.     Id.  
   129.     Id.  
   130.     Id.  
   131.     DCF  Fact  Sheet,  supra  note  4.    
   132.     Id.  
   133.     Id.  
   134.     Id.  
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involuntary   outpatient   placement   upon   a   finding   by   clear   and  
convincing  evidence  that  the  person:  (1)  has  a  mental  illness;  (2)  
is   unlikely   to   survive   safely   in   the   community   without  
supervision  based  on  a   clinical  determination;   (3)  has  a  history  
of   lack   of   compliance   with   treatment;   (4)   has,   within   the  
preceding  thirty-­‐‑six  months,  (i)  at  least  twice  been  involuntarily  
admitted,   or   (ii)   engaged   in   serious   violent   behavior   or   has  
attempted  serious  bodily  harm  to  his  or  her  self  or  others;  (5)  as  
a   result  of  mental   illness,   is  unlikely   to  participate   in   treatment  
or   has   refused   treatment   after   explanation;   (6)   is   in   need   of  
involuntary   outpatient   placement   to   prevent   relapse,   or  
deterioration,   likely   to   result   in   serious   bodily   harm   to   self   or  
others,   or   substantial   harm   to   the   person’s  well-­‐‑being;   (7)   will  
benefit   from   involuntary   outpatient   placement;   and   (8)   all   less  
restrictive   alternatives   have   been   adjudged   inappropriate   or  
unavailable  (involuntary  outpatient  placement  criteria.)135  
Florida’s   strict   involuntary   placement   criteria   combined  
with   its   failure   to   authorize   Ulysses   arrangements   preclude  
patients   from   obtaining   timely   intervention   when   an   episode  
has  caused  treatment  refusals.    Tuten  v.  Fariborzian  illustrates  this  
failure   can   be   fatal.136      Rebecca   Tuten’s   husband,   James,  
voluntarily   admitted   himself   to   a   facility   after   attempting  
suicide.137      After   three   days,   James   requested   release,   and  
doctors  discharged  him.138     Two  months   later,   James  attempted  
suicide  again  and  was  admitted  to  a  mental  health  facility.139    On  
the   third   day   at   the   facility,   James   requested   discharge.140     His  
physician   denied   his   request   because   he   believed   James   met  
involuntary  placement  criteria.141    A  facility  “administrator  filed  
a   petition   for   involuntary   placement   and   a   petition   for  
 
   135.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.4655(1)  (2013).  
   136.     Tuten  v.  Fariborzian,  84  So.3d  1063,  1065  (Fla.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  2012).    
   137.     Id.  
   138.     Id.  
   139.     Id.  
   140.     Id.  
   141.     Id.  
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adjudication  of   incompetence   to   consent   to   treatment  pursuant  
to   the  Baker  Act.”142     Before   the  hearing  on  the  petitions,   James  
again   requested   release.143     At   that   time,  his  physician  believed  
James   had   improved   and  was   able   to   function   in   an   available  
less   restrictive   environment,   no   longer   meeting   involuntary  
placement  criteria.144     The  physician  released  James.145     The  day  
after   his   release,   James   shot   his   wife   and   then   fatally   shot  
himself.146  
Rebecca   filed   suit   against   the   physician   and   the   facility.147    
She  alleged  the  Baker  Act  imposed  a  duty  to  keep  James  within  
the  facility  until  the  trial  court  ruled  on  the  petition.148    She  also  
argued  the  physician  and  the  facility  owed  James  a  duty  of  care,  
apart   from   the   Baker   Act,   which   they   breached   when   they  
released   him.149     Given   the   physician’s   opinion   that   James  was  
competent,  the  First  DCA  of  Florida  held  involuntary  placement  
would   have   violated   the   Baker   Act   and   James’s   constitutional  
rights.150      The   court   stated   the   Baker   Act   does   not   impose   an  
affirmative  obligation  on  psychiatrists  or  facilities  to  hospitalize  
a   patient   or   commence   proceedings   for   involuntary  
placement.151     They  cannot  be  held   liable   to   those  subsequently  
injured  by   the  patient   for   failing   to  do   so.152     As   to   the   alleged  
common   law   duty,   the   court   declined   to   require   doctors   to   be  
clairvoyant   and   “to  navigate   between  Scylla   and  Charybdis,   in  
deciding   whether   .   .   .   to   involuntarily   detain   and   examine   a  
patient.”153     This  is  a  reference  to  a  Latin  proverb,  which  means  
 
   142.     Id.  
   143.     Id.  
   144.     Id.  at  1065-­‐‑1067.  
   145.     Id.  at  1065.  
   146.     Id.  
   147.     Id.  
   148.     Id.  
   149.     Id.  
   150.     Id.  at  1066.  
   151.     Id.  at  1068.  
   152.     Id.  
   153.     Id.  at  1067  (quoting  Paddock  v.  Chacko,  522  So.2d  410,415  (Fla.  Dist.  Ct.  
App.  1988).  
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in  society’s  eagerness  to  avoid  one  evil,  society  often  falls  into  a  
greater   evil.154      There  was   no   common   law   duty   to   hospitalize  
James   against   his   will   when   his   physician   believed   he   had  
become   competent   to   make   his   own   decision   regarding  
commitment.155  
However,  improperly  detaining  and  hospitalizing  a  patient  
exposes   the   facility,   and   the   physician,   to   liability   for   various  
claims.156      Florida   courts   have   held   health   care   professionals  
involuntarily   holding   a   patient—without   compliance   with   the  
Baker   Act—constitutes   false   imprisonment.157      Moreover,   in  
Florida,   a   complaint   that   alleges   that   named   individuals  
collaborated   in   wrongfully   initiating   and   maintaining   civil  
proceedings  resulting  in  involuntary  examination,  states  a  cause  
of   action   for   malicious   prosecution.158      Even   when   there   is   no  
flagrant   disregard   of   Baker  Act   procedures,   the   physician  may  
be   liable   for   medical   negligence   for   a   wrongful   diagnosis   that  
results  in  improper  detention,  under  the  Baker  Act.159    The  Baker  
Act   itself   allows   the   patient   to   file   a   claim   against   any   person  
who   violates   the   patient’s   rights   under   the   Baker   Act   by,   for  
example,  admitting  a  patient  without  capacity  under  voluntary  
admission   procedures.160      Patients   may   also   have   federal   civil  
rights   claims  under   42  USC  §1983   for  due  process   violations   if  
the   Florida   facility   admits   the   patient   without   obtaining  
informed   consent   or   following   involuntary   placement  
procedures.161  
Therefore,  Florida  incentivizes  doctors  to  release  patients  in  
the   midst   of   episodes   that   induce   treatment   refusals   and  
 
   154.     Id.    
   155.     Id.  at  1067-­‐‑68.  
   156.     See  infra  notes  157-­‐‑159  and  accompanying  text.  
   157.     Everett  v.  Fla.  Inst.  of  Tech.,  503  So.2d  1382  (Fla.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  1987);  Liles  
v.  Medfield,  Inc.,  681  So.2d  711,  712  (Fla.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  1995).  
   158.     Pellegrini  v.  Winter,  476  So.2d  1363,  1366  (Fla.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  1985).  
   159.     Blom  v.  Adventist  Health  Sys./Sunbelt,  Inc.,  911  So.2d  211,  215  (Fla.  Dist.  
Ct.  App.  2005).  
   160.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.459(8)(b)  (2013).  
   161.     Zinermon  v.  Burch,  494  U.S.  113,  138-­‐‑39  (1990).  
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therefore   deters   early   intervention.      As   explored   in   Part   II,  
Florida   does   not   authorize   patients   to   form   Ulysses  
arrangements.162    In  this  way,  Florida  law  makes  patients  victims  
of   their   illnesses.      Patients   cannot   obtain   intervention   once   an  
episode   destroys   insight   but   must   wait   for   the   episode   to  
produce  violence  or  grave  disability,  making  the  patient   finally  
meet   involuntary   placement   criteria.163      As   was   the   case   for  
James  Tuten,  prolonging   intervention  until   the   time   the  person  
meets  involuntary  placement  criteria  can  be  dangerous.164  
ii.  Procedures  
Florida   sets   forth   procedures   that   provide   due   process  
protections   to   people   subject   to   involuntary   placement.165      The  
procedures   for   outpatient   and   inpatient   placement   are  
substantially   similar.166      First,   the   administrator   of   the   facility  
may   file   with   the   court   a   petition   for   involuntary   inpatient   or  
outpatient   treatment.167      The   petition   must   allege   each   of   the  
required  criteria  for  involuntary  placement.168     The  opinion  of  a  
psychiatrist   and   the   second   opinion   of   another   mental   health  
professional  based  on  the  examination  of  the  patient  within  the  
preceding  seventy-­‐‑two  hours  must  support  the  recommendation  
for  involuntary  placement.169  
“Within   [one]   court   working   day   after   the   filing   of   [the]  
petition   .   .   .   the   court   shall   appoint   [a]   public   defender   to  
represent   the   person   .   .   .   unless   [that]   person   is   otherwise  
represented  by  counsel.”170    The  attorney  shall  have  access  to  the  
 
   162.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.467  (2013).  
   163.     Id.  
   164.     Tuten  v.  Fariborzian,  84  So.3d  1063,  1065  (Fla.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  2012).  
   165.     FLA.  STAT.  §§  394.4655,  394.467  (2013).  
   166.     FLA.  STAT.  §§  394.4655(3),  394.467(3)  (2013).  
   167.     FLA.  STAT.  §§  394.4655(3)(a)-­‐‑(b),  394.467(3)  (2013).  
   168.     FLA.  STAT.  §§  394.4655(3),  394.467(2)  (2013).  
   169.     FLA.  STAT.  §§  394.4655(2)(a),  394.467(2)  (2013).  
   170.     FLA.  STAT.  §§  394.4655(4),  394.467(4)  (2013).  
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patient,  witnesses,  and  relevant  records.171     The  court  shall  hold  
the   hearing   on   involuntary   placement   within   five   days   of   the  
petition  filing.172    “If  the  court  finds  that  the  patient’s  attendance  
at   the   hearing   is   [in]consistent   with   the   best   interests   of   the  
patient  .  .  .  the  court  may  waive  the  presence  of  the  patient  from  
all   or   [a   portion]   of   the   hearing.”173      At   the   hearing,   the   court  
shall   allow   testimony   from   family   and   others   regarding   the  
patient’s   history   and   condition.174      “The   patient   may   refuse   to  
testify  at  the  hearing.”175    If  the  court  concludes  the  patient  meets  
involuntary   placement   criteria,   the   court   shall   issue   an   order  
that  shall  be   for  a  period  up  to  six  months.176     The   facility  shall  
discharge   a   patient   anytime   the   patient   no   longer   meets  
involuntary   placement   criteria.177      An   individual   ordered   to  
involuntary   inpatient  placement  may  receive  services   in  a   state  
mental   health   treatment   facility   or   a   short-­‐‑term   residential  
treatment  facility.178    The  average  length  of  stay  in  a  state  mental  
health   treatment   facility   is   1.7   years.179      Spending   over   a   year  
institutionalized   is   a   massive   deprivation   of   liberty.180      One  
wonders   if   many   of   these   people   could   avoid   such   long-­‐‑term  
hospitalization  if  they  were  able  to  obtain  effective  intervention  
at   the   outset   of   an   acute   episode,   before   they  met   involuntary  
examination  criteria.  
iii.  Appointment  of  Guardian  
At   the   hearing   concerning   involuntary   outpatient   or  
inpatient   placement,   “the   court   shall   consider   testimony   and  
 
   171.     Id.  
   172.     FLA.  STAT.  §§  394.4655(6)(a),  394.467(6)(a)  (2013).  
   173.     Id.  
   174.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.4655(6)(a)  (2013).  
   175.     FLA.  STAT.  §§  394.467(6)(a),  394.4655(6)(a)  (2013).  
   176.     FLA.  STAT.  §§  394.467(6)(b),  394.4655(6)(b)  (2013).  
   177.     Id.  
   178.     DCF  Fact  Sheet,  supra  note  4.    
   179.     Id.  
   180.     Humphrey  v.  Cady,  405  U.S.  504,  506-­‐‑09  (1972)  (civil  commitment  imposes  
a  massive  curtailment  of  liberty).  
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evidence   regarding   the   patient’s   competence   to   consent   to  
treatment.”181      If   the   court   finds   the   patient   is   incompetent   to  
consent   to   treatment,   the   court   shall   appoint   a   guardian  
advocate   (guardian).182      The   patient   has   the   right   to   have   an  
attorney  represent  her  at  the  hearing  to  appoint  a  guardian.183    If  
the  patient  is  indigent,  the  court  shall  appoint  a  public  defender  
to  represent  the  patient  at  that  hearing.184    The  patient  has  a  right  
to  testify,  cross-­‐‑examine  witnesses,  and  present  witnesses  at  the  
hearing   to  appoint  a  guardian.185     A  mental  health  professional  
must   testify   in   support   of   the   involuntary   placement.186      The  
guardian   must   agree   to   the   appointment.187      In   selecting   a  
guardian,   the  court  shall  give  preference   to   the  surrogate   if   the  
patient   has   already   designated   one.188      If   not,   the   court   shall  
select   a   guardian   from   a   priority   list,   which   begins   with   the  
spouse.189      The   guardian   shall   have   the   same   authorities   and  
restrictions   as   a   surrogate   designated   by   the   patient   in   a  
directive.190      Unless   the   guardian   has   sought   and   received  
express   court   approval   in   separate   proceedings,   the   guardian  
may   not   consent   to   electroconvulsive   therapy   or  
psychosurgery.191      The   court   may   only   grant   authority   to   a  
guardian   to  consent   to   these  procedures  based  on  evidence   the  
procedure   is   essential   to   the   care   of   the   patient   and   “does   not  
present   an   unreasonable   risk   of   serious,   hazardous,   or  
irreversible   side   effects.”192      “The   guardian   .   .   .   shall   be  
discharged   when   the   patient   is   discharged   from   an   order   for  
 
   181.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.467(d)  (2013).  
   182.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.4598(1)  (2013).  
   183.     Id.  
   184.     Id.  
   185.     Id.  
   186.     Id.  
   187.     Id.  
   188.     Id.  §  395.4598(5).  
   189.     Id.  
   190.     Id.  §  395.4598(6).  
   191.     Id.    
   192.     Id.  
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involuntary  outpatient   .   .   .  or   .   .   .   inpatient  placement,  or  when  
the  patient  is  transferred  .  .  .  to  voluntary  status.”193  
2. Reasons  Ulysses  Arrangements  are  Preferable  to  Involuntary  
Placement  
In   Florida,   intervention   through   a   Ulysses   arrangement   is  
preferable   to   involuntary  placement   for  patients,   and   the  State,  
for   several   reasons.      First,   intervention   through   involuntary  
placement  often  comes  too  late.194     Research  indicates  that  early  
intervention  at  the  onset  of  psychosis  greatly  improves  the  odds  
of  the  patient’s   long-­‐‑term  recovery.195     For  patients   in  the  midst  
of  a  mental  health  crisis,  time  is  of  the  essence.     Acute  episodes  
often   cause   destructive   behavior.196      Patients   should   not   be  
forced   to   wait   for   intervention   until   the   time   at   which   they  
finally  meet   involuntary  placement  criteria.197     By  that  time,   the  
episode   may   have   damaged   relationships   and   caused   job   loss  
and   a   criminal   record.198      Moreover,   as   illustrated   in   Tuten   v.  
Fariborzian,   where   a   discharged   patient   in   the   midst   of   an  
 
   193.     Id.  §  395.4598(7).  
   194.     Clausen,  supra  note  1,  at  5;  Anderson,  supra  note  8,  at  801  (quoting  patient  
testimony  "ʺwhen  someone  is  allowed  to  decompose  so  severely  before  they  can  get  
help  under  the  Involuntary  Treatment  Act,  they  never  come  back  quite  the  
same..."ʺ).  
   195.     Davoli,  supra  note  1,  at  1045  (early  intervention  at  the  onset  of  psychosis  
improves  the  odds  of  long-­‐‑term  recovery).  
   196.     Clausen,  supra  note  1,  at  n.  29;  PETE  EARLEY,  CRAZY:  A  FATHER'ʹS  SEARCH  
THROUGH  AMERICA'ʹS  MENTAL  HEALTH  MADNESS  2-­‐‑3  (2006)  (asserting  the  largest  
public  mental  health  facility  in  the  United  States  is  the  Los  Angeles  County  jail);  
Mental  Health  care,  Inc.  v.  Stuart,  909  So.2d  371,  374  (Fla.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  2005)  (there  
is  no  duty  to  warn  that  a  patient  may  be  dangerous,  even  when  the  patient  is  
involuntarily  committed  under  the  Baker  Act  because  of  the  "ʺinherent  
unpredictability  associated  with  mental  illness  and  the  near-­‐‑impossibility  of  
accurately  or  reliably  predicting  dangerousness"ʺ).  
   197.     FLA.  STAT.  §394.467;  394.4655;  Gallagher,  supra  note  13,  at  780  (setting  forth  
a  sample  Ulysses  arrangement).  
   198.     See  Davoli,  supra  note  1,  at  1045  (asserting  early  intervention  at  the  onset  of  
an  episode  may  prevent  erosion  of  the  patient’s  support  system);  Bruce  Rheinstein,  
'ʹNo  Vacancy'ʹ  Faces  Mentally  Ill,  DAILY  OKLAHOMAN,  Oct.  6,  2000,  
http://mentalillnesspolicy.org/imd/hospital-­‐‑bed-­‐‑shortage-­‐‑4-­‐‑states.html  (asserting  
mental  illness  prevents  many  patients  from  obtaining  private  insurance  through  
employment  and  patients  must  rely  on  Medicaid  to  pay  for  treatment).  
CLAUSEN  (DO  NOT  DELETE)   10/1/15    10:27  AM  
2015]   ULYSSES  IN  FLORIDA   29  
 
episode  shot  himself  and  his  wife,  untreated  episodes  endanger  
the   patient’s   safety   and   the   safety   of   others.199      The   Ulysses  
arrangement  empowers  the  patient  to  secure  intervention  at  the  
onset   of   an   episode,   before   she   meets   involuntary   placement  
criteria.200  
Second,   this  Article’s   proposal   authorizes   patients   to   form  
Ulysses   arrangements   to   secure   up   to   three  weeks   of   inpatient  
treatment.201      For   many   patients,   three   weeks   is   sufficient   to  
return  to  full  functioning.202     Relying  on  the  average  4.5  days  of  
treatment  in  response  to  an  involuntary  examination  is  too  risky  
for  patients.203    In  Florida,  once  seventy-­‐‑two  hours  have  elapsed  
from   arrival   at   the   facility,   doctors  must   release   a   patient  who  
refuses   treatment   unless   she   meets   involuntary   examination  
criteria.204      After   seventy-­‐‑two   hours,   many   patients   will   no  
longer   meet   the   strict   criteria   but   will   nonetheless   be   in   the  
midst   of   an   episode   that   continues   to   cause   them   to   refuse  
treatment.205    Once  released,  these  vulnerable  patients  will  likely  
fail   to   recognize   their   need   for   treatment,   continue   to   refuse  
intervention,  and  continue  to  deteriorate.206  
Third,   Ulysses   arrangements   empower   patients   to   secure  
less   time-­‐‑consuming   and   less   intrusive   intervention   than  
involuntary   inpatient   placement.      This   is   because   the   Ulysses  
arrangement   enables   the   patient   to   obtain   intervention   before  
the   patient  meets   involuntary   placement   criteria.      Through   the  
arrangement,  the  patient  can  prevent  further  deterioration  of  her  
 
   199.     Tuten  v.  Fariborzian,  84  So.3d  1063,  1065  (Fla.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  2012).  
   200.     Clausen,  supra  note  1,  at  n.  3-­‐‑4.  
   201.     See  infra  Part  III.  
   202.     Rebecca  S.  Dresser,  Ulysses  and  the  Psychiatrists:  A  Legal  and  Policy  Analysis  
of  the  Voluntary  Commitment  Contract,  16  HARV.  C.R.-­‐‑C.L.  L.  REV.  777,  n.  3  (1982)  
(stating  that  for  example  in  Sweden  a  medical  director  may  lay  down  a  condition  
for  admission  that  the  patient  shall  not  be  permitted  to  leave  within  three  weeks  of  
admission,  even  if  he  desired  to  do).  
   203.     DCF  Fact  Sheet,  supra  note  4.  
   204.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.463(f)  (2013).  
   205.     See  e.g.,  Tuten  v.  Fariborzian,  84  So.3d  1063,  1065  (Fla.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  2012).  
   206.     Id.  
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cognitive   functions   resulting   from   leaving   an   episode  
untreated.207      Early   intervention   returns   the   patient   to   full  
capacity   sooner.208      Involuntary   inpatient   placement   criteria  
force   the   patient,   whose   illness   has   caused   her   to   refuse  
treatment,   to   delay   intervention   until   she   is   essentially  
dangerous.209      Self-­‐‑binding   treatment   will   likely   return   the  
patient’s   capacity   within   three   weeks.210      Conversely,   the  
average  length  of  stay  in  a  state  mental  health  treatment  facility  
is   1.7   years.211      Many   patients   could   avoid   this   significant  
intrusion   into   their   lives   if   overriding   their   illness-­‐‑induced  
refusals  and  obtaining  early  intervention  were  possible.  
Fourth,   intervention   through   a   Ulysses   arrangement   is  
likely   to   be   more   therapeutic   than   involuntary   inpatient  
placement.      The  Ulysses   arrangement   empowers   the   patient   to  
secure   treatment   from   the   patient’s   regular   psychiatrist,   who  
understands   the   patient’s   illness   and   history   in   a   facility   the  
patient   chooses.212      A   person   is   most   likely   to   receive   the   best  
care   from  providers  who  have   treated   the  person   in   the  past.213    
Baker   Act   receiving   facilities   are   both   public   and   private  
hospitals.214      There   are   approximately   2,600   beds   in   private  
hospitals  for  adults  and  659  beds  in  public  hospitals  for  adults.215    
There  have  been  many  complaints  about  the  treatment  in  public  
hospitals.216      As   one   patient   advocate   said   about   the   South  
Florida   State   Hospital,   “People   there   are   not   getting   any  
 
   207.     Davoli,  supra  note  1,  at  1045.  
   208.     Id.  
   209.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.467(1)(a)  (2013).  
   210.     Dresser,  supra  note  202,  at  n.  3.  
   211.     DCF  Fact  Sheet,  supra  note  4.  
   212.     Bruce  J.  Winick,  Advance  Directive  Instruments  for  Those  with  Mental  Illness,  
51  U.  MIAMI  L.  REV.  57,  83  (1996).  [hereinafter  Advance  Directive  Instruments].  
   213.     Id.  at  72.  
   214.     DCF  Fact  Sheet,  supra  note  4.  
   215.     Id.  
   216.     See  Jenni  Bergal,  Mental  Hospital'ʹs  Cost  Per  Patient  Leads  State,  SUN  
SENTINEL,  Feb.  27,  1990,  http://articles.sun-­‐‑sentinel.com/1990-­‐‑02-­‐‑
27/news/9001260683_1_mental-­‐‑hospitals-­‐‑patient-­‐‑florida-­‐‑state-­‐‑hospital.  
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treatment.  They  smoke  and  they  eat.   It’s  ridiculous.”217      In  2012  
the   First   DCA   of   Florida   said,   “It   has   been   recognized   that  
mental  illness  may  be  caused  or  intensified  by  institutionalizing  
mental   patients.”218      Therefore,   the   practice   of   psychiatry   is   no  
longer  limited  to  institutionalizing  people  with  mental  illness.219    
Institutionalized   patients   may   be   less   likely   to   heal   as   quickly  
because  of  sleep  deprivation  and  stress  brought  on  by  the  noise  
and  behaviors  of  fellow  patients.220  
Fifth,   Ulysses   arrangements   enable   patients   to   avoid   the  
trauma   of   involuntary   inpatient   placement.221      There   is   some  
evidence   involuntarily   committed  patients  are  at   risk   for  abuse  
from   other   patients   and   from   staff.222      Decades   ago,   it  was   the  
deplorable   conditions   of   the   Florida   State   Hospital   in  
Chattahoochee   (Chattahoochee),   which   was   the   subject   of   the  
landmark  case  O’Connor  v.  Donaldson,223  that  gave  momentum  to  
 
   217.     Id.  
   218.     Tuten  v.  Fariborzian,  84  So.3d  1063,  1067  (Fla.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  2012).  
   219.     Id.  
   220.     Tuten,  84  So.3d  at  1067  (citing  Paddock  v.  Chacko,  552  So.2d  410,  413-­‐‑14  
(Fla.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  1988)  for  the  following,  "ʺmental  illness  may  be  caused  or  
intensified  by  institutionalizing  mental  patients"ʺ);  See  also.  Civil  Commitment  of  the  
Mentally  Ill,  87  HARV.  L.  REV  1190,  1195-­‐‑97  (1974)  (stating,  “Hospitalization  itself  
interferes  with  privacy,  since  the  patient  cannot  shield  himself  from  constant  
observation  by  both  his  fellow  patients  and  staff"ʺ).  
   221.     Tuten,  84  So.3d  at  1067;  Clausen,  supra  note  1,  at  13.  
   222.     Carol  M.  Miller,  Florida  Hospital  Ignores  Pregnant  Mental  Patient'ʹs  Pleas,  and  
Tragedy  Ensues,  MIAMI  HAROLD,  June  2,  2012,  
http://www.miamiherald.com/incoming/article1940320.html  (outlining  story  of  
neglect  of  pregnant  mental  health  patient  in  Chattahoochee,  resulting  in  death  of  
newborn  child);  Britney  Jones,  Exclusive:  Witness  Speaks  Out  About  Abuse  at  Florida  
State  Hospital,  Sept.  4,  2013,    http://www.wtxl.com/news/exclusive-­‐‑witness-­‐‑speaks-­‐‑
out-­‐‑about-­‐‑abuse-­‐‑at-­‐‑fla-­‐‑state-­‐‑hospital/article_e8a80a84-­‐‑15bd-­‐‑11e3-­‐‑8e6d-­‐‑
0019bb30f31a.html  (an  anonymous  witness  told  reporters  staff  at  Chattahoochee  
were  abusing  residents  and  some  of  the  residents  were  beaten  and  sexually  
abused);  Beverly  Stracher,  Report  Assails  Mental  Hospital,  SOUTH  FLORIDA-­‐‑SENTINEL,  
Oct.  6,  1988,    http://articles.sun-­‐‑sentinel.com/1988-­‐‑10-­‐‑06/news/8802280198_1_two-­‐‑
dozen-­‐‑patients-­‐‑psychiatric-­‐‑rehabilitation-­‐‑advocacy-­‐‑center  (asserting  advocacy  
group  denounced  conditions  at  South  Florida  State  Hospital  and  accused  staff  of  
allowing  patients  to  go  without  clothing,  ridiculing  and  abusing  patients  and  
providing  no  rehabilitation).  
   223.     O'ʹConnor  v.  Donaldson,  422  U.S.  563,  574-­‐‑575  (1975);  see  also  Frendak  v.  
United  States,  408  A.2d  364,  376  (D.C.  Cir.  1979)  ("ʺFurthermore,  patients  in  [State]  
hospitals  risk  brutality  at  the  hands  of  their  fellow  residents  and  even  their  
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the   deinstitutionalization   movement,   causing   the   closure   of  
many   state   mental   health   institutions   in   the   United   States.    
Although   conditions   in   Florida’s   mental   health   hospitals   have  
improved,   allegations   of   abuse   and   neglect   remain.      For  
example,   in   2013,   an   anonymous   witness   told   reporters   that  
some   staff   in   Chattahoochee   physically   abused   patients.224    
Similarly,   in   2011,   a   Chattahoochee   patient   alleged   a   nurse  
neglected  to  care  for  her  when  she  was  pregnant,  resulting  in  the  
death  of  her  child.225    At  thirty-­‐‑eight  weeks  pregnant,  the  patient  
went   into   labor.226      The   attending   nurse   ignored   her   calls   for  
help.227    The  patient  called  authorities,  but  the  hospital  staff  told  
authorities   no   intervention   was   necessary.228      Ultimately,   she  
was   airlifted   to   another   facility.229      “The   baby   came   out   on   the  
helicopter,   attached   to   the  mother,   with   the   head   on   the   floor  
with  everyone  looking  at  the  baby  on  the  floor  of  the  helicopter  
not  breathing.”230    The  child  had  no  brain  activity  and  died  when  
he  was  eight  months  old.231  
Sixth,   Ulysses   arrangements   enable   people   to   avoid   the  
dehumanizing  experience  of  commitment  hearings.232    The  Baker  
Act  permits  a  judge  to  excuse  the  patient  from  the  hearing  if  his  
presence  could  damage  the  patient’s  health.233    This  is  an  implicit  
recognition   that   involuntary   placement   hearings   can   be  
demeaning   for   patients.234      The   Baker   Act   expressly   permits  
 
attendants”).  
   224.     Jones,  supra  note  222.  
   225.     Lynn  Hatter,  Family  Speaks  Out  After  Florida  State  Mental  Hospital  Nurse  
Charged  with  Neglect,  Oct.  26,  2012,  http://news.wfsu.org/post/family-­‐‑speaks-­‐‑out-­‐‑
after-­‐‑fla-­‐‑state-­‐‑mental-­‐‑hospital-­‐‑nurse-­‐‑charged-­‐‑neglect;  Miller,  supra  note  222.  
   226.     Id.  
   227.     Id.  
   228.     Id.  
   229.     Id.  
   230.     Hatter,  supra  note  225.  
   231.     Id.  
   232.     Clausen,  supra  note  1,  at  14;  Advance  Directive  Instruments,  supra  note  212,  at  
68-­‐‑69.  
   233.     FLA.  STAT.  §§  394.4655(6)(a),  394.467(6)(a)  (2013).  
   234.     Id.  
CLAUSEN  (DO  NOT  DELETE)   10/1/15    10:27  AM  
2015]   ULYSSES  IN  FLORIDA   33  
 
family  and  other  individuals  to  testify  at  involuntary  placement  
hearings.235      Therefore,   patients   at   involuntary   placement  
hearings  often  endure   the  humiliating  experience  of  witnessing  
loved   ones   testify   about   erratic   behaviors   caused   by   an  
episode.236  
Seventh,  Ulysses   arrangements   empower  patients   to   avoid  
guardianship   proceedings.     As   explained   above,   the   Baker  Act  
provides   for   the   initiation   of   guardianship   proceedings   if   the  
involuntarily   committed   patient   is   unable   to   consent   to  
treatment.237      Incompetency   adjudications,   a   form   of   deviance  
labeling,   have   seriously   detrimental   societal   consequences   and  
cause   significant   psychological   damage   to   the   ward.238      Some  
psychiatrists  posit  “guardianship  poses  a  danger  of  harming  the  
patient’s  civil  rights,  autonomy,  and  independence,”  and  should  
be   recommended   “only   as   a   last   resort   for   patients   who   are  
severely   incompetent.”239      The  Ulysses   arrangement   empowers  
the   patient   to   designate   a   surrogate   who   can   administer   the  
patient’s  self-­‐‑authored  intervention  plan.240    The  patient  can  then  
avoid  the  humiliating  experience  of  guardianship  proceedings.  
Eighth,   Ulysses   arrangements   potentially   preserve   scarce  
judicial   and   public   defender   resources   in   Florida.      Involuntary  
placement   is   time-­‐‑consuming   and   expensive   for   courts   and  
public   defenders.241      Adjudicatory   hearings   strain   already  
overcrowded  dockets   of   Florida   courts.242      Representing   clients  
subject   to   involuntary   placement   burdens   already   overworked  
 
   235.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.4655(6)(a)  (2013).  
   236.     Id.  
   237.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.4598(1)  (2013).  
   238.     Robert  D.  Miller,  Advance  Directives  for  Psychiatric  Treatment:  A  View  from  
the  Trenches,  4  PSYCHOL.  PUB.  POL’Y  &  LAW  728,  736  (1998).  
   239.     Clausen,  supra  note  1,  at  20;  Yuval  Melamed  et  al.,  Guardianship  for  the  
Severely  Mentally  Ill,  19  MED.  &  L.  321,  325  (2000).  
   240.     Clausen,  supra  note  1,  at  55-­‐‑56.  
   241.     DCF  Fact  Sheet,  supra  note  4  (asserting  involuntary  examinations  are  on  the  
rise  and  have  increased  50%  in  the  last  10  years  resulting  in  150,000  in  2011;  
approximately  10%  of  these  involuntary  examinations  result  in  a  hearing).  
   242.     FLA.  STAT.  §§  394.4655(6),  394.467(6)  (2013).  
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public  defenders.243     Some  of  these  clients  would  not  need  state  
subsidized   legal   representation   if   they   could   prevent  
involuntary  placement  through  a  Ulysses  arrangement.244  
Ninth,   Ulysses   arrangements   provide   for   more   cost-­‐‑
effective   intervention   for   whoever   shoulders   the   financial  
burden.     Many  patients  with  Ulysses   arrangements  will   obtain  
intervention   in   private   hospitals   of   their   choosing.245      In   these  
instances,   the   taxpayer   does   not   shoulder   the   cost   of   care.246    
Because   mental   illness   may   disrupt   the   ability   to   obtain  
employment   and   preclude   employment   sponsored   private  
insurance,   some   patients   may   receive   treatment   through  
Medicaid   or   at   a   state   hospital.247      Regardless   of   who   pays,  
intervention   through   a   Ulysses   arrangement   is   less   expensive  
than   involuntary   placement.248      This   is   because   Ulysses  
arrangement  intervention  occurs  early  and  can  be  accomplished  
with   a   shorter   hospital   stay.249      When   intervention   is   delayed  
until   the   time   the  person  meets   involuntary  placement   criteria,  
the   episode  will   have   had   a  more   serious   impact   on   cognitive  
functions.250      This  may   be  why   the   average   length   of   stay   in   a  
 
   243.     Id.;  Karen  Houppert,  Legal  Aid  for  Indigent  Clients  Needs  Help,  WASH.  POST,  
Mar.  15,  2013,  http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/legal-­‐‑aid-­‐‑for-­‐‑indigent-­‐‑
clients-­‐‑needs-­‐‑help/2013/03/15/65dcbe56-­‐‑8cc9-­‐‑11e2-­‐‑b63f-­‐‑f53fb9f2fcb4_story.html.  
   244.     Clausen,  supra  note  1,  at  61.  
   245.     See  Clausen,  supra  note  1,  at  13-­‐‑14;  Stracher,  supra  note  222.  
   246.     Bergal,  supra  note  216.  
   247.     Rheinstein,  supra  note  198;  Dylan  Scott,  Study:  Medicaid  Improves  Mental  But  
Not  Physical  Health,  May  2,  2013,  http://www.governing.com/news/state/gov-­‐‑study-­‐‑
medicaid-­‐‑improves-­‐‑mental-­‐‑wellbeing-­‐‑but-­‐‑not-­‐‑physical-­‐‑health.html  (asserting  
uninsured  adults  who  receive  Medicaid  coverage,  as  many  will  under  the  
Affordable  Care  Act,  experience  substantial  improvement  in  their  mental  well-­‐‑
being  according  to  report  from  researchers  at  Harvard  School  of  Public  Health  and  
The  Massachusetts  Institute  of  Technology).  
   248.     See  Bergal,  supra  note  216;  Dylan  Scott,  supra  note  247.  
   249.     Scott,  supra  note  247  (supporting  states  accepting  Medicaid  expansion  
because  "ʺif  people  are  covered,  they'ʹll  be  able  to  nip  things  in  the  bud  and  get  
treatment  earlier,"ʺ  says  Debbie  Plotnick,  senior  director  of  state  policy  at  Mental  
Health  America,  an  advocacy  group.).  
   250.     Id.  (urging  states  like  Florida  to  accept  the  Affordable  Care  Act'ʹs  Medicaid  
expansion  "ʺespecially  for  people  with  mental  health  conditions,  the  further  
upstream  you  can  step  in  and  intervene,  the  better  the  outcomes  for  the  patients"ʺ).  
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state  mental  health  hospital  is  1.7  years.251  
Finally,   Ulysses   arrangements   are   a   needed   alternative   to  
involuntary  placement  because  there  is  a  shortage  of  psychiatric  
hospital  beds.252    Florida  ranks  forty-­‐‑ninth  of  all  fifty  states  in  its  
spending  per  capita  on  mental  health  agencies.253     The  National  
Alliance  on  Mental   Illness   found  “Florida   residents   face   ‘uphill  
battles  [in  getting]  appropriate  care’  .  .  .  partly  because  [Florida]  
has  a  shortage  of  inpatient  psychiatric  beds.    Many  of  these  beds  
are   used   to   ‘restore   competency’   for   people   facing   criminal  
charges.”254      Empowering   patients   to   prevent   involuntary  
placement   through  Ulysses   arrangements  would   enable   public  
mental  health  hospitals  to  focus  on  restoring  competency.  
  
II.  FLORIDA’S  FAILURE  TO  PROVIDE  THE  ULYSSES  ARRANGEMENT  
OPTION  
This   Section   first   sets   forth   components   of   a   Ulysses   enabling  
statute.      Then   this   Section   explores   why   Florida’s   generic  
directive   statute   does   not   provide   patients   with   the   Ulysses  
arrangement  option.  
 
   251.     DCF  Fact  Sheet,  supra  note  4.  
   252.     Mary  Zdanowicz  and  Bruce  Rheinstein,  Florida'ʹs  Mentally  Ill  Left  Out  in  the  
Cold,  ORLANDO  SENTINEL  (Mar.  23,  2000),  
http://mentalillnesspolicy.org/imd/hospital-­‐‑bed-­‐‑shortage-­‐‑4-­‐‑states.html  (Florida  
threatening  to  close  350  hospital  beds  for  the  most  severely  mentally  ill  citizens;  a  
person  in  Florida  with  severe  mental  illness  is  five  times  more  likely  to  be  behind  
bars  than  receiving  treatment  in  a  state  hospital;  there  are  at  least  15,870  inmates  in  
Florida'ʹs  jails  who  are  mentally  ill;  the  Miami  Dade  County  jails  alone  hold  nearly  
1000  mentally  ill  inmates  many  of  whom  are  locked  up  because  of  behavior  caused  
by  untreated  illness).  
   253.     Mental  Health  Spending:  State  Agency  Totals,  GOVERNING,  
http://www.governing.com/gov-­‐‑data/mental-­‐‑health-­‐‑spending-­‐‑by-­‐‑state.html  (last  
visited  Jan.  8,  2015).  
   254.     Kevin  A.  Kepple,  Mental  Health  Grades  by  State,  USA  TODAY  (Jan.  8,  2013  
10:13  PM),  http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/01/07/states-­‐‑mental-­‐‑
health/1805023/(reporting  from  National  Alliance  on  Mental  Illness  that  Florida  
residents  face  uphill  battles  to  get  care  partly  because  the  state  has  a  shortage  of  
inpatient  psychiatric  beds,  many  of  which  are  used  to  restore  competency  for  
people  facing  criminal  charges).  
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A.  COMPONENTS  OF  A  ULYSSES  ENABLING  STATUTE  
Before   illustrating   how   Florida   deprives   patients   of   the  
Ulysses  arrangement  tool,  it  is  necessary  to  describe  the  essential  
components   of   a   Ulysses   enabling   statute.      First,   the   enabling  
statute   must   allow   patients   to   choose   whether   their   directives  
will   be   revocable   when   they   lack   capacity.255      For   a   patient   to  
form   a   self-­‐‑binding   arrangement,   she  must   be   able   to   create   a  
directive  that  is   irrevocable  when  an  episode  has  destroyed  her  
capacity.256      To  obtain   intervention,   the  patient  must   be   able   to  
prevent   herself   from:   (1)   refusing   care   to   which   she   has  
consented  in  the  arrangement,  and  (2)  revoking  the  arrangement  
when  an  episode  causes  her  to  do  so.257  
Simply   allowing   patients   to   form   irrevocable   directives  
does  not  empower  patients  to  form  Ulysses  arrangements.     The  
enabling   statute   must   have   a   process   to   ensure   patients   who  
form  Ulysses  arrangements  do  so  knowingly  and  voluntarily.258    
Moreover,   the   enabling   statute   must   set   forth   procedural  
protections   for   administering   treatment   in   the   face   of  
contemporaneous  objections.259     Without  a  well-­‐‑defined  process  
and   clear   authority,   a   doctor   will   not   force   treatment   on   a  
refusing   patient   based   only   on   consent   provided   in   an  
irrevocable  directive.260    Even  with  the  typical  statutory  grant  of  
provider   immunity,  doctors  will   be   justifiably   concerned  about  
liability  for  unlawfully  administering  involuntary  treatment.261  
Physician  reluctance  to  treat  in  the  face  of  patient  refusals  is  
not   the   paramount   concern.      A  more   serious   concern   involves  
risks   of   coercion,   undue   influence,   and   fraud   when   doctors  
 
   255.     Clausen,  supra  note  1,  at  27;  Roberto  Cuca,  Ulysses  in  Minnesota:  First  Steps  
Toward  a  Self-­‐‑Binding  Psychiatric  Advance  Directive  Statute,  78  CORNELL  L.  REV.  1152,  
1173  (1993).  
   256.     Cuca,  supra  note  255,  at  1173.  
   257.     Id.  
   258.     Id.  
   259.     Id.  at  1181-­‐‑1185.  
   260.     See  supra  notes  156-­‐‑161  and  accompanying  text.  
   261.     Id.  
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forcibly   hospitalize   and   treat   a   patient,   even  when   the   patient  
does   not   meet   involuntary   placement   criteria.262      The   enabling  
statute   must   provide   procedural   protections   to   ensure   doctors  
implement   arrangements   in   strict   compliance   with   patient  
instructions.  
Finally,   the   enabling   statute   should   provide   patients   the  
option   to  arrange   for   transportation   to  a   facility.     Episodes   that  
cause   treatment   refusals   also   cause   patients   to   refuse  
transportation  to  a  hospital.263      If   the  patient  is  unable  to  obtain  
transportation   in   contravention   of   refusals,   she   cannot   secure  
intervention  through  her  Ulysses  arrangement.  
B.  FLORIDA’S  GENERIC  DIRECTIVE  STATUTE  
1.  Purports  to  Address  Mental  Health  
Half   of   the   states   recognize   that   mental   illness   implicates  
different   issues   than   end-­‐‑of-­‐‑life   treatment   and   have   enacted  
separate   mental   health   directive   statutes.264      Florida   has   not  
enacted  a  separate  mental  health  directive  statute,  but  relies  on  a  
generic  directive  statute  to  govern  advance  planning  for  end-­‐‑of-­‐‑
life   and   mental   health   treatment.265      The   Florida   statutory  
scheme   entitled   Health   Care   Advance   Directives   (Florida’s  
generic   directive   statute)   purports   to   address   all   types   of  
advance   health   care   planning,   including   planning   for   mental  
illness.266    For  example,  Florida’s  generic  directive  statute  defines  
an   advance  directive   as   a   document   or   statement   in  which   the  
principal  gives  instructions  or  designates  a  surrogate  to  address  
 
   262.     Dresser,  supra  note  202,  at  800.  
   263.     Moraes  v.  Horizons  of  the  Treasure  Coast,  Inc.,  2013  WL  4009438  (S.D.  
Fla.).  
   264.     Clausen,  supra  note  1,  at  24-­‐‑25,  n.213  (listing  Arizona,  Hawaii,  Idaho,  
Illinois,  Indiana,  Kentucky,  Louisiana,  Maine,  Maryland,  Michigan,  Minnesota,  
Montana,  New  Jersey,  New  Mexico,  North  Carolina,  Ohio,  Oklahoma,  Oregon,  
Pennsylvania,  South  Dakota,  Tennessee,  Texas,  Utah,  Washington,  and  Wyoming).  
   265.     FLA.  STAT.,  Ch.  765  (2013).  
   266.     FLA.  STAT.  §  765.101(1)  (2013)  (defining  advance  directive  to  include  
instructions  concerning  any  aspect  of  health  care).  
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any  aspect  of  the  principal’s  health  care.267     The  statute  defines  a  
health  care  decision  to  encompass  informed  consent,  refusal,  or  
“withdrawal  of  consent  to  any  and  all  health  care,  including  life-­‐‑
prolonging   procedures   and  mental   health   treatment.”268      Finally,  
the   Florida   generic   directive   statute   addresses   a   few   issues  
unique   to  mental   illness.      For   example,   the   statute   prohibits   a  
surrogate  from  authorizing  the  principal’s  electroshock  therapy,  
psychosurgery,   or   voluntary   admission   to   a   mental   health  
facility   without   express   authority   from   the   principal   or   court  
approval.269  
Despite   the  fact  Florida’s  generic  directive  statute  purports  
to   address   advance   planning   for   mental   illness,   the   statute  
focuses   primarily   on   end-­‐‑of-­‐‑life   treatment.270      For   example,   the  
legislative  findings  address  end-­‐‑of-­‐‑life  and  palliative  care  but  do  
not  mention  mental  health   treatments.271     Moreover,   the  statute  
gives   instructions   for   the  creation  of   living  wills.272     The  statute  
does  not  even  mention,  much  less  give  instructions  for,  creating  
mental  health  directives.273    The  statute  defines  a  living  will  as  a  
declaration  directing  “the  providing,  withholding  or  withdrawal  
of   life-­‐‑prolonging   procedures   in   the   event   that   such   person   has   a  
terminal   condition,   has   an   end-­‐‑stage   condition,   or   is   in   a   persistent  
vegetative  state”  or  “a  witnessed  oral  statement  .  .  .  expressing  the  
principal’s   instructions   concerning   life-­‐‑prolonging   procedures.”274    
As   defined   in   Florida,   living   wills   do   not   address   any   issues  
faced  by  people  with  episodic  mental  illness.275  
The   entire   generic   directive   statute   is   divided   into   five  
parts,   each   of   which   contains   several   statutory   sections.276      Of  
 
   267.     FLA.  STAT.  §  765.101(1)  (2013).  
   268.     FLA.  STAT.  §  765.101(5)(a)  (2013).  
   269.     FLA.  STAT.  §  765.113(1)  (2013)  (emphasis  added).  
   270.     FLA.  STAT.  §  765.102  (2013).  
   271.     Id.  
   272.     FLA.  STAT.  §  765.302  (2013).  
   273.     FLA.  STAT.,  ch.  765  (2013).  
   274.     FLA.  STAT.  §§  765.101(11),  765.302(1)  (2013)  (emphasis  added).  
   275.     FLA.  STAT.  §  765.101(11)  (2013).  
   276.     FLA.  STAT.,  ch.  765  (2013).  
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these   five   parts,   one   concerns   life-­‐‑prolonging   procedures.277    
Another   concerns   anatomical   gifts.278      Moreover,   there   is   a  
statutory   section   concerning   persistent   vegetative   states.279    
There  is  no  part  or  section  concerning  mental  health  directives.280    
This   is   another   example   of   the   generic   directive   statute’s   focus  
on  end-­‐‑of-­‐‑life  treatment,  not  episodic  mental  illness.281  
Although  there  are  other  ways  in  which  the  Florida  generic  
directive   statute   fails  people  with  mental   illness,282      this  Article  
explores   its   failure   to   empower   patients   to   form   Ulysses  
arrangements.      The   key   reasons   the   statute   fails   to   empower  
Ulysses  arrangements  are  explored  in  this  Section.    First,  Florida  
does   not   enable   patients   to   determine  whether   their   directives  
are  revocable  when  they  lack  capacity.283    Second,  Florida  fails  to  
provide  safeguards  to  ensure  Ulysses  arrangements  are   formed  
knowingly   and   voluntarily.284      Third,   Florida   does   not   provide  
authority   and   a   well-­‐‑defined   process   for   administering  
treatment   in   the   face   of   contemporaneous   refusals.285      Finally,  
patients   have   no  mechanism   to   arrange   for   transportation   to   a  
facility   to   obtain   intervention   pursuant   to   a   Ulysses  
arrangement.286  
 
   277.     FLA.  STAT.  §§  765.301-­‐‑765.309  (2013).  
   278.     FLA.  STAT.  §§  765.510-­‐‑765.547  (2013).  
   279.     FLA.  STAT.  §  765.404  (2013).  
   280.     FLA.  STAT.,  ch.  765  (2013).  
   281.     Id.  
   282.     See  e.g.,  FLA.  STAT.  §  765.113  (2013)  (prohibiting  a  surrogate  from  
consenting  to  the  principal'ʹs  voluntary  admission  to  a  mental  health  facility  absent  
express  written  authority  from  the  principal.    This  arbitrary  limitation  on  a  
surrogate'ʹs  ability  to  consent  to  the  principal'ʹs  inpatient  treatment  could  result  in  
principals  not  receiving  care  they  need  and  to  which  they  consented  .  It  essentially  
requires  the  principal  to  use  magic  words  conveying  authority  to  a  surrogate.  This  
imposes  a  unique  burden  only  on  people  with  mental  illness).  For  further  
discussion,  see  Clausen,  supra  note  1,  at  25-­‐‑26  (discussing  Cohen  v.  Bolduc,  760  N.E  
2d  714,  715  (2002)).  
   283.     FLA.  STAT.  §  765.104(1)  (2013).  
   284.     See  infra  p.  65.  
   285.     FLA.  STAT.,  ch.  765  (2013).  
   286.     Id.  
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2.  Inadequate  Safeguards  to  Ensure  Voluntary  Formation  
a.  No  Choice  Regarding  Revocation  
The  Florida   generic   directive   statute   requires   the  principal  
to   be   competent   (or   have   capacity)   to   revoke   or   amend   her  
directive  or  designate  a  surrogate.287    Florida  fails  mental  health  
patients  when  it  deprives  them  of  the  right  to  designate  whether  
they   can   revoke   their   directives   when   they   lack   capacity.288    
Ulysses  arrangements  only  protect  patient  autonomy  if  they  are  
formed   knowingly   and   voluntarily.289     No   patient   should   have  
an   irrevocable   directive   as   her   only   advance   planning   option.    
There  is  a  legitimate  concern  that  family  and  providers  will  use  
Ulysses   arrangements   as   coercive   tools   to   force   treatment   on  
vulnerable  patients.290    Doctors  implement  Ulysses  arrangements  
without   the   due   process   protections   afforded   in   civil  
commitment.291      To   ensure   the   patient   wishes   doctors   to  
administer   treatment   despite   objections,   the   patient  must   have  
the   right   to   choose   whether   her   directive   remains   revocable  
when  she  lacks  capacity.     A  key  reason  Florida  does  not  have  a  
process   to   support   Ulysses   arrangements   is   Florida   fails   to  
ensure  that  when  patients  form  irrevocable  directives,  they  do  so  
knowingly  and  voluntarily.292     Florida  patients  do  not  have   the  
option  to  revoke  directives  when  they  lack  capacity.293    A  patient  
without   this   option   cannot   make   a   knowing   and   voluntary  
decision   as   to   whether   her   directive   should   remain   revocable  
 
   287.     In  this  way,  Florida  departs  from  the  majority  of  state  generic  directive  
statutes  which  allow  patients  to  revoke  their  generic  directives  even  when  they  lack  
capacity.  However,  the  majority  of  states  with  specialized  mental  health  directive  
statutes  also  require  capacity  for  revocation.  See  Clausen  supra  note  1,  at  29-­‐‑31.  
   288.     FLA.  STAT.  §  765.104(1)  (2013).  
   289.     Cuca,  supra  note  255,  at  1172.  
   290.     Dresser,  supra  note  202,  at  852;  Advance  Directive  Instruments,  supra  note  
212,  at  87,  94.  
   291.     Dresser,  supra  note  202,  at  800.  
   292.     FLA.  STAT.  §  765.104  (2013).  
   293.     FLA.  STAT.  §  765.104(1)  (2013).  
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when  she  lacks  capacity.294  
b.  Requirement  for  a  Signed,  Witnessed  Writing  
Whether   a   principal   may   orally   designate   a   surrogate   or  
issue  health  care  instructions  is  debatable  in  Florida.295    Florida’s  
generic   directive   statute   defines   an   advance   directive   as   “a  
witnessed   written   document   or   [an]   oral   statement   in   which  
instructions  are  given  by  a  principal  or  in  which  the  principal’s  
desires   are   expressed   concerning   any   aspect   of   the   principal’s  
health   care,   [including]  .  .  .   designation   of   a  .  .  .   surrogate.”296    
The   statutory   definition   implies   principals   may   issue   oral  
instructions   and  may   orally   designate   surrogates.297     However,  
the   Florida   generic   directive   statutory   section   governing  
designation   of   a   surrogate   states   a   written   document  
designating   a   surrogate  must   be   signed  by   the  principal   in   the  
presence   of   two   adult   witnesses.298      The   statute   also   precludes  
the  surrogate  from  acting  as  a  witness  and  requires  at  least  one  
witness  to  be  unrelated  to  the  principal.299     Some  Florida  courts  
have   interpreted   this   provision   to   require   designations   of  
surrogates   to   be   in   a   signed,   witnessed   writing.300      However,  
 
   294.     Id.;  See  Clausen  supra  note  1,  at  30  (asserting  restricted  revocation  only  for  
mental  health  directives  deters  patients  from  advance  planning  because  almost  half  
of  patients  surveyed  indicated  they  wanted  the  authority  to  revoke  their  mental  
health  directives  when  they  lack  capacity.  Such  patients  will  avoid  forming  
directives  if  they  can  only  form  irrevocable  directives).  
   295.     FLA.  STAT.  §  765.101(1)  (2103).  
   296.     Id.  
   297.     Id.  
   298.     FLA.  STAT.  §  765.202(1)  (2013).  
   299.     FLA.  STAT.  §  765.202(2)  (2013).  
   300.     See  generally  Estate  of  Jenner  v.  Manor  Pines  Convalescent  Center,  L.L.C.,  
112  So.3d  648,  649-­‐‑650  (Fla.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  2013)  (“holding  designation  of  surrogate  
executed  by  nursing  home  resident  which  named  resident'ʹs  husband  as  surrogate  
was  not  completed  in  conformance  with  the  statutory  requirements  and  did  not  
grant  husband  authority  to  enter  into  nursing  home  agreement  for  the  care  of  the  
resident.    The  court  stated  FLA.  STAT.  §  765.202  governs  the  means  by  which  an  
individual  may  designate  a  surrogate  and  requires  a  writing  signed  by  the  principal  
in  the  presence  of  two  witnesses,  or  a  principal  unable  to  sign  the  instrument  may  
in  the  presence  of  witnesses,  direct  another  person  to  sign  the  principal'ʹs  name.    
The  court  found  the  designation  of  the  husband  as  surrogate  was  not  completed  in  
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arguably,  the  definition  of  advance  directives  seems  to  authorize  
oral   instructions   and   designations   of   surrogates.301      Moreover,  
the   fact   the  Florida  generic  directive  statute  authorizes  patients  
to   orally   amend   or   revoke   their   directives   supports   the  
interpretation   allowing  patients   to   orally   designate   a   surrogate  
and  issue  health  care  instructions.302  
With   its   focus   on   end-­‐‑of-­‐‑life,   the   Florida   generic   directive  
statute   fails   to   provide   guidance   on   the   creation   of   a   mental  
health   directive.303      Rather,   it   specifies   the   procedures   for  
creating  a   living  will.304     A   living  will   is  a  witnessed  writing  or  
oral   statement   directing   the   providing,   withholding,   or  
withdrawing   of   life-­‐‑prolonging   procedures   in   the   event   the  
principal  has  a  terminal  condition,  an  end-­‐‑stage  condition,  or  is  
in   a   persistent   vegetative   state.305     According   to   this   definition,  
living  wills  do  not  include  mental  health  directives  which  do  not  
address   end-­‐‑of-­‐‑life   care,   but   treatment   to   be   administered  
during   mental   illness   episodes.306      Therefore,   Florida   fails   to  
provide  adequate  guidance  on  forming  a  directive  that  contains  
instructions   about   mental   health   treatment   or   designates   a  
surrogate  to  direct  the  patient’s  mental  health  care.307    Moreover,  
it   completely   fails   to   address   the   procedures   for   forming   a  
Ulysses   arrangement   through   which   a   patient   directs   mental  
health   treatment   to  be  administered  despite  her   illness-­‐‑induced  
refusals.308  
 
conformance  with  FLA.  STAT.  §  765.202  because  the  husband  testified  he  signed  the  
designation  for  his  wife.  He  did  not  indicate  he  did  so  in  front  of  witnesses.    He  
seemed  to  indicate  his  wife  did  not  have  the  capacity  at  the  time  to  make  any  
decisions,  much  less  the  decision  to  appoint  a  surrogate.”    See  Clausen,  supra  note  1,  
at  note  301).  
   301.     FLA.  STAT.  §  765.101(1)  (2013).  
   302.     FLA.  STAT.  §  765.104(1)(c)  (2013).  
   303.     FLA.  STAT.,  ch.  765  (2013).  
   304.     FLA.  STAT.  §§  765.302-­‐‑765.304  (2013).  
   305.     FLA.  STAT.  §  765.101(11)  (2013).  
   306.     Richard  A.  Van  Dorn  et.  al.,  Reducing  Barriers  to  Completing  Psychiatric  
Advance  Directives,  35  ADMIN.  POL’Y  MENTAL  HEALTH  440,  441  (2008).  
   307.     FLA.  STAT.,  ch.  765  (2013).  
   308.     Id.  
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Although   allowing   patients   to   issue   oral   instructions   and  
orally   designate   a   surrogate   makes   sense   in   the   end-­‐‑of-­‐‑life  
context,   it   is   problematic   in   the   context   of   Ulysses  
arrangements.309      When   a   clinician   implements   a   Ulysses  
arrangement,   she   treats   the   patient   despite   the   patient’s  
contemporaneous   refusals.310      It   is   essential   that   there   is   clear  
evidence  the  patient  formed  the  Ulysses  arrangement  free  from  
undue   influence,   coercion,   or   fraud.      Mental   illness   can   leave  
loved  ones  desperate   to  conquer   the  patient’s   illness.311     That   is  
why   scholars   have   expressed   concern   about   the   potential   for  
family   members   to   use   the   Ulysses   arrangement   to   coerce   a  
desired   treatment   on   a   patient.312      Mental   health   patients   are  
especially   vulnerable   to   undue   influence   and   coercion   because  
of   their   concern   over   involuntary   commitment   and   forced  
treatment.313      Therefore,   Ulysses   arrangements   should   only   be  
implemented   when   they   are   embodied   in   a   signed,   witnessed  
writing.     When   a   disinterested   witness   attests   that   the   patient  
provided   identification  and  did  not  appear   to  be  under  duress,  
there   is   a   safeguard   against   fraud,   coercion,   or   undue  
influence.314  
Mental   health   treatment   is   especially   susceptible   to   health  
care   fraud   for   several   reasons.315      First,   Florida   courts   have  
recognized   the   practice   of   psychiatry   is   subjective.316      This  
 
   309.     FLA.  STAT.  §  765.101(1)  (2013).  
   310.     Gallagher,  supra  note  13,  at  780  (setting  forth  a  sample  Ulysses  
arrangement).  
   311.     Dresser,  supra  note  202,  at  851-­‐‑852;  Advance  Directive  Instruments,  supra  note  
212,  at  58,  88.  
   312.     Dresser,  supra  note  202  at  852;  Advance  Directive  Instruments,  supra  note  212,  
at  87.  
   313.     Bruce  J.  Winick,  Outpatient  Commitment:  A  Therapeutic  Jurisprudence  
Analysis,  9  PSYCHOL.  PUB.  POL’Y  &  L.  107,  112  (2003).  
   314.     See  infra  Part  III.  
   315.     Elizabeth  A.  Rosenfeld,  Mental  Health  Advance  Directives:  A  False  Sense  of  
Autonomy  for  the  Nation'ʹs  Aging  Population,  9  ELDER  L.  J.  53,  77  (2001);  Pamela  H.  
Bucy,  Healthcare  Fraud  and  the  False  Claims  Act,  A.B.A.  CTR.  CONTINUING  LEGAL  
EDUC.  9  at  6-­‐‑7  (1998).  
   316.     Paddock    v.  Chacko,  552  So.2d  410,  414  (Fla.  Dist.  Ct.  App.    1988  )  (stating,  
"ʺThe  science  of  psychiatry  represents  the  penultimate  gr[a]y  area"ʺ  and  "ʺ[a]  
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subjectivity   makes   it   easier   for   providers   to   administer  
unnecessary  treatment.317    Second,  mental  health  patients  whose  
capacities   often   fluctuate   may   be   less   able   to   chronicle   their  
treatment   than  patients  with  physical   illness.318     Finally,  patient  
confidentiality   is   of   paramount   importance   in   mental   health  
care.319      This   cloak   of   secrecy   makes   health   care   fraud   more  
difficult   to   detect.320      A   clinician   with   a   financial   interest   in  
administering   treatment   should   not   administer   mental   health  
treatment   in   contravention   of   a   patient’s   objections   when   the  
patient   does   not   meet   involuntary   placement   criteria   without  
clear   evidence   the   patient  wanted   treatment   despite   refusals.321    
A   writing   requirement   helps   prevent   clinicians   from  
fraudulently   claiming   the   patient   orally   requested   to   receive  
treatment  despite  objections.    Moreover,  even  when  the  clinician  
has   no   fraudulent   intention,   it   is   easy   for   a   surrogate   or   a  
clinician   to   recollect   incorrectly   an   oral   statement   or   to  
misinterpret   the  patient’s   oral   statement.322     Written   statements  
are   much   less   susceptible   to   misinterpretation   and   cannot   be  
recollected  incorrectly.  
A  requirement  for  a  signed,  witnessed  writing  also  protects  
clinicians   who   implement   Ulysses   arrangements   from   liability  
for   fraudulent   claims   they   unlawfully   forced   treatment   on   a  
patient.    When  a  clinician  implements  a  Ulysses  arrangement,  he  
treats   in   contravention   of   the   patient’s   objections323   and   is  
vulnerable   to   claims   he   unlawfully   forced   treatment   on   the  
patient.      The   written,   signed,   and   witnessed   Ulysses  
 
substantial  body  of  literature  suggests  that  the  psychiatric  field  cannot  even  agree  
on  [an]  appropriate  diagnosis,  much  less  [a  recommended]  course  of  treatment"ʺ)  
(quoting  Nesbitt  v.  Cmty.  Health  of  South  Dade,  Inc.,  467  So.2d  711,  717  (Fla.  Dist.  
Ct.  App.  1985)).  
   317.     Bucy,  supra  note  315,  at  6.  
   318.     Id.    
   319.     Id.  
   320.     Id.  
   321.     See  Clausen,  supra  note  1,  at  48-­‐‑49.  
   322.     Id.  at  36-­‐‑37.  
   323.       Andreou,  supra  note  9,  at  1.  
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arrangement   provides   a   record   that   the   patient   requested  
treatment  despite  illness-­‐‑induced  refusals  and  protects  clinicians  
from   fraudulent   claims.      Therefore,   as   explored   in   Part   III,  
Florida   should   adopt   legislation   authorizing   patients   to   form  
Ulysses   arrangements   and   require   those   arrangements   to   be  
evidenced  by  a  written,  signed,  and  witnessed  instrument.  
c.  No  Requirement  for  Capacity  Assessment  
Florida  does  not   require  a  principal   to  have  an  assessment  
of   her   capacity   or   competence   in   order   to   form   an   advance  
directive,   which   either   issues   health   care   instructions   or  
designates   a   surrogate.324      The   Florida   generic   directive   statute  
states  the  “principal  is  presumed  to  be  capable  of  making  health  
care   decisions   for   herself   or   himself   unless   she   or   he   is  
determined  to  be  incapacitated.”325    Moreover,  “[I]ncapacity  may  
not   be   inferred   from   the   person’s   voluntary   or   involuntary  
hospitalization   for  mental   illness  or   from  her  or  his   intellectual  
disability.”326      In   Florida,   only   competent   (which   in   Florida   is  
synonymous   with   having   capacity)   adults   may   form   advance  
directives.327    This  is  because  Florida  defines  a  principal  to  be  “a  
competent  adult  executing  an  advance  directive”328  and  defines  
an   advance  directive   as  written   or   oral   instructions   given   by   a  
principal.329     A   living  will  or  designation  of  a  surrogate   formed  
pursuant   to   the   Florida   generic   directive   statute   “establishes   a  
rebuttable  presumption  of  clear  and  convincing  evidence  of  the  
principal’s  competent  wishes.”330    Unless  the  principal’s  capacity  
to  make  health  care  decisions  is  called  into  question,  there  is  no  
requirement   for   an   assessment   of   competence/capacity   at   the  
 
   324.     FLA.  STAT.  §§  765.202(1),  765.101(1)  (2013).  
   325.     Id.  §  765.204(1).  
   326.     Id.  
   327.     Id.  §  765.101(14).  
   328.     Id.    
   329.     Id.  §  765.101(1).  
   330.     Id.  §§  765.302(3),  765.202(7).  
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time  of  directive  formation.331  
Ulysses   arrangements   are   different   than   other   forms   of  
mental   health   directives,   such   as   directives   refusing   certain  
mental   health   treatments.332      Ulysses   arrangements   are  
instruments   of   self-­‐‑paternalism   and   self-­‐‑coercion.333      The  
arrangement   respects   the   patient’s   self-­‐‑determination   by  
empowering  her   to  control  her   treatment  even  during  episodes  
that  induce  her  to  refuse  intervention.334    To  prevent  family  and  
providers   from   using   Ulysses   arrangements   as   coercive  
instruments   to   force   treatment   on   a   patient,335   there   must   be  
clear   evidence   the   patient   formed   the   arrangement   when   she  
had   capacity.      Therefore,   there   should   be   a   requirement   for   a  
physician  assessment  and  attestation  of  the  patient’s  capacity  at  
the  time  of  Ulysses  arrangement  formation.     Florida’s  failure  to  
require  such  capacity  assessment  and  attestation  is  another  way  
in  which  it  deprives  patients  of  the  Ulysses  arrangement  option  
and   fails   to   ensure   such   arrangements   are   formed   voluntarily  
and  only  by  patients  with  capacity.336  
d.  No  Automatic  Expiration  
Although   states   typically   do   not   require   automatic  
expiration   of   generic   directives,   many   states   with   specialized  
mental  health  directive  statutes   impose  automatic  expiration  of  
mental   health   directives   after   a   specified   time   frame,   usually  
between   two   and   five   years.337      At   the   end   of   this   time   frame,  
 
   331.     Id.  §  765.204(2).  
   332.     See,  e.g.,  In  re  Rosa  M.,  597  N.Y.S.2d  544  (1991)  (concerning  patient’s  mental  
health  directive  refusing  ECT).  
   333.     Dresser,  supra  note  202,  at  784-­‐‑5.  
   334.     Willigenburg  &  Delaere,  supra  note  9  (Ulysses  arrangements  "ʺuphold  the  
guidance  provided  by  one'ʹs  deepest  identity  conferring  concerns"ʺ  and  prevent  
episodes  from  threatening  a  person'ʹs  "ʺself"ʺ).  
   335.     Winick,  supra  note  212,  at  87.  
   336.     See  FLA.  STAT.  §  765.204(1)  (2013)  (the  Florida  statute  for  capacity  does  not  
require  a  physician  assessment  or  attestation  of  the  patient’s  capacity).  
   337.     VHA  Report,  supra  note  1,  at  4;  Clausen,  supra  note  1,  at  41;  see,  e.g.,  TEX.  
CIV.  PRAC.  &  REM.  CODE  ANN.  §  137.002(c)  (2013);  TENN.  CODE  ANN.  §  33-­‐‑6-­‐‑1003  
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patients   must   reaffirm   their   mental   health   directives   or   they  
expire.338      In  Florida,  no  directive  expires  automatically.  This   is  
probably   because   Florida   does   not   have   a   specialized   mental  
health  directive   statute.339     The  Florida  generic  directive   statute  
asserts   that   “[u]nless   [the   designation   of   a   surrogate]   states   a  
time  of   termination,   the  designation  shall   remain   in  effect  until  
revoked  by  the  principal.”340  
Another   illustration   of   the   way   that   Florida’s   generic  
directive   statute   fails   to   set   forth  a  process   for   forming  Ulysses  
arrangements  is  its  failure  to  provide  for  automatic  expiration  in  
any   instance.341     Automatic   expiration   is  warranted   for  Ulysses  
arrangements   for   two   reasons.342      First,   Ulysses   arrangement  
critics   are   concerned   the   arrangements   do   not   provide   true  
informed   consent   because   consent   provided   through   the  
arrangement   is   expired   and   not   contemporaneous.343      When   a  
doctor   implements   a   Ulysses   arrangement,   he   does   so   in  
accordance   with   informed   consent   provided   months   or   years  
before   the   treatment   is   administered.344      Automatic   expiration  
does   not   make   the   patient’s   informed   consent   truly  
contemporaneous,   but   it   does   ensure   informed   consent   is  
relatively   recent.345      The   patient   must   reaffirm   consent   to  
intervention   despite   contemporaneous   objections   every   couple  
of  years.346  
 
(2014);  OR.  REV.  STAT.  ANN.  §  127.702(2)  (2011);  OHIO  REV.  CODE  §  2135.03  (2013).  
   338.     VHA  Report,  supra  note  1,  at  4.  
   339.     FLA.  STAT.,  ch.  765  (2013).  
   340.     FLA.  STAT.  §  765.202(6)  (2013).  
   341.     Id.  
   342.     See  Clausen,  supra  note  1,  at  42-­‐‑43.  However,  automatic  expiration  is  not  
warranted  for  mental  health  directives  when  the  jurisdiction  does  not  provide  for  
automatic  expiration  for  generic  directives  because  imposing  this  administrative  
burden  only  on  mental  health  patients:  (1)  requires  only  mental  health  patients  to  
track  the  age  of  directives;  (2)  stigmatizes  mental  illness;  and  (3)  undermines  parity  
for  mental  healthcare.  
   343.     Dresser,  supra  note  202.  
   344.     Clausen,  supra  note  1,  at  42-­‐‑43;  Dresser,  supra  note  202,  at  830.  
   345.     Clausen,  supra  note  1,  at  42-­‐‑43.  
   346.     VHA  Report,  supra  note  1,  at  4.  
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Moreover,   Ulysses   arrangement   critics   express   concern  
about   the   possibility   of   unanticipated   consequences   due   to   a  
patient’s  change  of  heart  or  failure  to  predict  all  contingencies.347    
A   patient  may   execute   a   Ulysses   arrangement   consenting   to   a  
certain   psychotropic   medication.      Months   later,   when   doctors  
implement   the   arrangement,   the   patient   has   changed   her  
medication   regimen.      Automatic   expiration   requires  
reaffirmation   of   the   mental   health   crisis   intervention   plan.348    
Patients   and  doctors  must   engage   in  ongoing  dialogue.349     This  
process  helps  ensure  the  arrangement  is  a  living  document  that  
is  kept  current  with  the  patient’s  illness  and  evolving  treatment  
options.350      The   patient   must   periodically   re-­‐‑examine   whether  
she  needs  or  wants  to  continue  to  direct  doctors  to  override  her  
illness-­‐‑induced  treatment  refusals.  
3. No  Process  for  Implementing  Ulysses  Arrangements  
a. No  Procedures  for  Treating  Despite  Objections  
When  doctors  implement  a  Ulysses  arrangement,  they  treat  
a   patient   in   accordance   with   her   irrevocable   directive   even  
though   she   voices   contemporaneous   objections.351      Ulysses  
arrangement   opponents   argue   the   arrangement   violates   due  
process  because  doctors  forcibly  hospitalize  and  treat  the  patient  
even  when  she  does  not  meet   involuntary  placement  criteria.352    
Moreover,   doctors   forcibly   treat   without   the   procedural  
protections   afforded   in   involuntary   placement   such   as   a   full  
adjudicatory   hearing   in   which   the   patient   is   represented   by  
counsel.353  
 
   347.     Advance  Directive  Instruments,  supra  note  212,  at  88.  
   348.     VHA  Report,  supra  note  1,  at  4.  
   349.     Id.  
   350.     Id.  
   351.     Gallagher,  supra  note  13,  at  780.  
   352.     Dresser,  supra  note  202,  at  800.  
   353.     Id.  at  813-­‐‑814.  
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Despite   this   legitimate   concern,   the   liberty   deprivation  
implicated   when   doctors   implement   a   Ulysses   arrangement   is  
far  less  than  the  massive  deprivation  of  liberty  involved  in  long-­‐‑
term   involuntary   placement.354      As   Florida   courts   have  
recognized,  long-­‐‑term  institutionalization  may  actually  cause,  or  
intensify,  mental   illness.355     Ulysses  arrangements  offer  patients  
a   mechanism   to   prevent   long-­‐‑term   institutionalization.      When  
the   physician   implements   the   arrangement,   the   physician  
follows   the   patient’s   advance   written   instructions.356      The  
involuntarily   committed   patient   has   not   provided   advance  
consent.357  
Because   of   these  due  process   concerns,   a  Ulysses   enabling  
statute  must  provide  procedural  protections  and  a  clear  process  
for  administering  treatment  pursuant  to  an  irrevocable  directive,  
despite   illness-­‐‑induced   refusals.358      Florida’s   generic   directive  
statute,  with  its  focus  on  end-­‐‑of-­‐‑life,  fails  to  do  so.359    The  statute  
does   not   lay   out   a   process   to   follow   when   a   patient   with   an  
irrevocable  directive—requesting  inpatient  treatment—arrives  at  
a   hospital   in   the   midst   of   an   episode   that   has   induced   her   to  
refuse   intervention.360      The   statute   fails   to   set   forth   procedures  
for  administering  treatment  pursuant  to  an  irrevocable  directive  
when  the  patient  voices  contemporaneous  objections.361  
A   comparison   between   the   Washington   mental   health  
directive   statute   and   Florida’s   generic   directive   statute   reveals  
the  shortcomings  of  Florida’s  statute.362    The  Washington  statute  
lays  out  procedures  doctors  must  follow  when  implementing  an  
 
   354.     Cuca,  supra  note  255,  at  1153.  
   355.     Tuten  v.  Fariborzian,  84  So.3d  1063,  1067  (Fla.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  2012)  (quoting  
Paddock  v.  Chacko,  552  So.2d  410,  413-­‐‑414  (Fla.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  1988)).  
   356.     Gallagher,  supra  note  13,  at  780.  
   357.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.467(1)  (2013).  
   358.     Willigenburg  &  Delaere,  supra  note  9,  at  396.  
   359.     FLA.  STAT.,  ch.  765  (2013).FLA.  STAT.  Ch.  765  
   360.     Id.  
   361.     Id.  
   362.     Id.  
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irrevocable  directive.363    When  a  patient’s  mental  health  directive  
is   irrevocable   during   periods   of   incapacity   and   the   patient  
consents   to   inpatient   mental   health   treatment,   but   the   patient  
refuses  admission,  the  facility  may  admit  the  patient  even  if  the  
patient   refuses.364      Such   self-­‐‑binding   admission   may   only   be  
done  in  compliance  with  strict  criteria.365    First,  one  physician,  in  
conjunction  with  another,  must  evaluate  and  determine  whether  
the  patient   lacks  capacity.366     Second,  the  physician  must  obtain  
the  informed  consent  of  the  patient’s  surrogate  if  the  patient  has  
designated  one.367    Next,  the  physician  must  evaluate,  determine,  
and   make   a   written   finding   that   the   patient   needs   inpatient  
evaluation   or   treatment   that   cannot   be   accomplished   in   a   less  
restrictive  setting.368    Then,  the  physician  must  document,  in  the  
patient’s   medical   record,   a   summary   of   her   findings   and  
recommendations.369  
If   the   physician   determines   the   patient   has   capacity,   the  
physician  may  only   admit   the  patient,   or   the  patient  may  only  
remain   in   inpatient   treatment,   if   the   patient   consents   or   is  
detained  under   involuntary  commitment   law.370      If   two  doctors  
determine   the  patient   lacks  capacity,   the   facility  may  retain   the  
patient  for  up  to  two  weeks,  but  only  for  the  number  of  days  the  
patient   consented   to   inpatient   treatment   in   her   irrevocable  
directive.371      After   that   time,   the   facility   must   discharge   the  
patient   unless   she   regains   capacity   and   consents   to   more  
treatment,   or   the   facility   detains   the   patient   under   involuntary  
commitment  law.372    The  patient  may  seek  injunctive  relief  if  she  
 
   363.     WASH.  REV.  CODE  §  71.32.140  (2013).  
   364.     Id.  §  71.32.140(2).  
   365.     Id.  
   366.     Id.  §  71.32.140(2)-­‐‑(3).  
   367.     Id.  §  71.32.140(2)(b).  
   368.     Id.  §  71.32.140(2)(c).  
   369.     Id.  §  71.32.140(2)(d).  
   370.     Id.  §  71.32.140(4)(a).  
   371.     Id.  §  71.32.140(5).  
   372.     Id.    
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contests   her   admission.373      Washington’s   well-­‐‑defined   process  
helps   protect   against   coercion   and   abuse.374      In   many   ways,  
Washington’s  process  is  a  model  for  Florida.  
However,  Washington’s  process  is  flawed  because  it  fails  to  
empower   patients   to   form   truly   self-­‐‑binding   arrangements.    
First,   even   if   the   patient’s   irrevocable   directive   consents   to  
inpatient   treatment   despite   her   contemporaneous   objections,  
Washington   requires   a   facility   to   discharge   the   patient   if   she  
takes   actions   demonstrating   a   desire   to   be   discharged   in  
addition  to  requesting  discharge.375    According  to  the  legislative  
history,   because   this   is   a   voluntary   admission,   a   patient   who  
takes  action  by  demanding  discharge  must  be  discharged  unless  
she   meets   involuntary   commitment   criteria.376      However,   the  
legislature   does   not   explain   why   the   patient’s   illness-­‐‑induced  
demands   must   override   her   consent   in   her   irrevocable  
directive.377      In   this   way,  Washington   deprives   patients   of   the  
right   to   form  a  Ulysses  arrangement  and  deprives  patients  of  a  
useful  crisis  prevention  tool.378  
Another  shortcoming  of  the  Washington  statute  is  its  failure  
to   address   whether   a   patient’s   refusal   of   admission   and  
treatment  in  contravention  of  the  irrevocable  directive  supports  
a  determination  that  the  patient  lacks  capacity.379    Episodes  often  
induce   people   to   refuse   intervention.380      A   written   directive  
provides   evidence   that   the   patient,   when   she   had   capacity,  
wanted   intervention.      Washington   fails   to   assist   the   doctor   in  
assessing   capacity.381      When   a   patient   arrives   at   a   facility  
refusing   admission,   which   she   requested   in   her   irrevocable  
 
   373.     Id.  §  71.32.140(4)(b).  
   374.     Id.  §  71.32.230.  
   375.     Id.  §  71.32.140(6)(b).  
   376.     2003  WASH.  SESS.  LAWS  1496,  1504.  
   377.     Id.  
   378.     Clausen,  supra  note  1,  at  32-­‐‑33.  
   379.     WASH.  REV.  CODE  §§  71.32.140,  71.32.110  (2013).  
        380.      JAMISON,  supra  note  1,  at  37;  Davoli,  supra  note  1,  at  1009;  VHA  Report,  
supra  note  1,  at  8;  Clausen,  supra  note  1,  at  4-­‐‑5.  
   381.     WASH.  REV.  CODE  §§  71.32.140(2)(a),  71.32.110(1)-­‐‑(2)(a).  
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directive,   she   necessarily   exhibits   incapacity.      The   reason   the  
patient   formed  an   irrevocable  directive   requesting   intervention  
is   to  override  her   refusals.      Florida  doctors  will   be   reluctant   to  
implement  Ulysses  arrangements.382    Only  a  small  percentage  of  
patients   execute  mental  health  directives.383     Doctors  have   little  
experience   implementing   mental   health   directives,   much   less  
Ulysses   arrangements.384      Psychiatrists   are   extremely   familiar  
with   the   strict   criteria   for   involuntary   evaluation   and  
placement.385      Unless   the   Ulysses   enabling   statute   clearly  
instructs   otherwise,   Florida   doctors   will   likely   try   to   insulate  
themselves  from  liability  for  unlawfully  involuntarily  detaining  
and  treating  a  patient.386    Therefore,  they  will  discharge  patients  
whose   illnesses   cause   them   to   refuse   intervention   requested   in  
their   directives.      Such   discharge   disrespects   the   patient’s  
autonomy   because   it   does   not   follow   the   patient’s   written  
instructions   in   her   directive   and   potentially   endangers   the  
patient  and  others.  
Florida   cases   illustrate   premature   discharge   can   be  
dangerous.      For   example,   in   Tuten   v.   Fariborzian   discussed   in  
Part   I,   Ms.   Tuten   sued   the   psychiatrist   and   hospital   for  
discharging   her   husband,   James,   pending   his   involuntary  
placement   hearing.387      The   discharge   occurred   because   James  
demanded   discharge,   and   Dr.   Fariborzian   believed   James   had  
become   able   to   function   in   a   less   restrictive   environment,   no  
longer  meeting   involuntary  placement  criteria.388     The  day  after  
 
   382.     See  Clausen,  supra  note  1,  at  33.  
   383.     Maria  J.  O'ʹConnell  &  Catherine  H.  Stein,  Psychiatric  Advance  Directives:  
Perspectives  of  Community  Stakeholders,  32  ADMIN.  &  POL’Y  MENTAL  HEALTH  241,  242  
(2005)  (less  than  7%  of  people  surveyed  with  schizophrenia  had  directives);  Jeffrey  
Swanson  et  al.,  34  J.  AM.  ACAD.  PSYCHIATRY  &  L.  43,  54  (2006)  (between  four  and  
13%  of  mental  health  patients  surveyed  had  directives).  
   384.     O’Connell  &  Stein,  supra  note  383,  at  242;  Swanson  et  al.,  supra  note  383,  at  
54-­‐‑55.  
   385.     FLA.  STAT.  §§  394.463,  394.467  (2013).  
   386.     See  supra  p.  123  &  nn.156-­‐‑161.  
   387.     Tuten  v.  Fariborzian,  84  So.3d  1063,  1065  (Fla.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  2012)..  
   388.     Id.  
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discharge,  James  killed  himself  and  shot  his  wife.389  
Similarly,   in  Moraes   v.  New  Horizons   of   Treasure   Coast,   Inc.,  
the   plaintiff,   the   personal   representative   of   the   estate   of   his  
mother,   Mariangela,   brought   suit   for   negligence   against   New  
Horizons,  a  Baker  Act  receiving  facility,  for  allegedly  negligently  
discharging  Mariangela,   resulting   in  her   suicide.390     Mariangela  
experienced  an  acute  mental   illness  episode  while   in  a  hospital  
emergency   room.391      Port   St.   Lucie   police   subsequently  
involuntarily   committed   Mariangela   to   an   inpatient   facility,  
New   Horizons,   pursuant   to   the   Baker   Act.392      Under   the  
influence  of  the  episode,  Mariangela  did  not  recognize  her  need  
for   treatment   and   refused   to   sign   consent   for   treatment   or  
informed  consent  forms.393    She  also  revealed  paranoid  delusions  
when  she  stated  her  roommate  was  trying  to  poison  her  and  the  
facility   should   not   send   a   killer   to   her   room.394      Almost   a   day  
later,   a   physician   involuntarily   examined   Mariangela   and  
determined   she  was   incompetent   to   provide   informed   consent  
and   should   remain   hospitalized   for   emergency   treatment.395    
However,   later   that   day,   the   physician   apparently   determined  
she  no  longer  met  Baker  Act  criteria  and  approved  Mariangela’s  
release.396      It   was   the   doctor’s   impression   that   being   in   the  
facility  would   increase   her   paranoia.397     He   released   her   to   the  
custody  of  her  son,  the  plaintiff.398    Her  son  allowed  Mariangela  
to   drive   home.399      She   drove   extremely   dangerously.400      A  
bystander  called  9-­‐‑1-­‐‑1.  Police  arrived  and  took  Mariangela  back  
 
   389.     Id.  at  1066.  
   390.     Id.  at  1065.  
   391.     Moraes  v.  Horizons  of  the  Treasure  Coast,  Inc.,  2013  WL  4009438  (S.D.  
Fla.).  
   392.     Id.  
   393.     Id.  
   394.     Id.  
   395.     Id.  
   396.     Id.  
   397.     Id.  
   398.     Id.  
   399.     Id.  
   400.     Id.  
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into   custody,   pursuant   to   the   Baker   Act.401     While   en   route   to  
New  Horizons,  Mariangela  attacked  the  police  officers.402     They  
arrested  her  and  took  her  to  jail  for  resisting  arrest  with  violence  
and  battery  on  a   law  enforcement  officer.403     She  was  placed   in  
the   jail   infirmary   for  observation.  She  committed  suicide   in  her  
cell  the  next  day.404  
What   if   James   and   Mariangela   had   previously   executed  
Ulysses   arrangements   directing   their   physicians   to   keep   them  
hospitalized   for   twenty-­‐‑one   days   following   an   acute   mental  
illness   episode,   even   if   they   no   longer   met   involuntary  
placement  criteria?    What  if  the  Florida  legislature  had  adopted  
the   legislative   relief   proposed   in   Part   III   which   empowers  
patients   to   form  Ulysses  arrangements?     The  physicians  would  
have   had   clear   authority   to   hospitalize   and   treat   James   and  
Mariangela   longer,  giving   the  vulnerable  patients  more   time   to  
heal.    This  extra  time  might  have  saved  their  lives.  
The   final   shortcoming  of   the  Washington   statute,   explored  
in   Part   II(3)(d)   is   its   failure   to   empower   patients   to   request  
involuntary   transportation   to   a   hospital   to   effectuate   a  Ulysses  
arrangement.  
b. Insufficient  Safeguards  
To  explain  why  Florida’s  generic  directive  statute  fails  to  set  
forth  safeguards  sufficient  to  support  Ulysses  arrangements,  it  is  
necessary   to   describe   some   mental   health   treatments.    
Psychiatric   drugs   can   effectively   treat   mental   illness,   and   one  
type  of  psychiatric  medication,  called  antipsychotic  medication,  
can  be  particularly   effective   in   limiting  psychosis.405     However,  
 
   401.     Id.  
   402.     Id.  
   403.     Id.  
   404.     Id.  
   405.     Douglas  Mossman,  Unbuckling  the  "ʺChemical  Straitjacket"ʺ:  The  Legal  
Significance  of  Recent  Advances  in  the  Pharmacological  Treatment  of  Psychosis,  39  SAN  
DIEGO  L.  REV.  1033,  1054  (2002).  
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antipsychotic   drugs  potentially   cause   serious   side   effects.406      In  
the   1990s,   new   antipsychotic   drugs   emerged   called   “atypical”  
because   they   were   different   than   the   older   antipsychotic  
medications   in   that   they   alleviate   psychotic   symptoms   with  
fewer  side  effects.407  
Electroconvulsive   therapy   (electroshock   treatment   or   ECT)  
is  generally  considered  to  be  more  invasive  than  pharmaceutical  
therapy.408    It  directs  electric  currents  to  parts  of  the  brain,  which  
then   causes   seizures.409      Although   the   modern   medical  
community   acknowledges   ECT   as   an   effective   and   safe  
treatment   for   certain   patients,   ECT   is   still   controversial.410    
Critics  posit  ECT  can  permanently  damage  the  brain  and  cause  
permanent  memory  gaps.411    
Psychosurgery  includes  operations  referred  to  as  lobotomy,  
psychiatric   surgery,  behavioral   surgery,  or  any  surgery  doctors  
perform   to   modify   or   control   thoughts,   feelings,   or   behavior  
rather  than  treating  a  diagnosed  physical  disease  of  the  brain.412    
The   modern   medical   community   views   many   of   these  
procedures   as   discredited   and   dangerous   because   they   risk  
permanent   brain   damage.413      More   modern   psychosurgery  
techniques   involve   creating   small   lesions   in   the   brain.414      Even  
modern   techniques   are   highly   intrusive   and   are   reserved   for  
 
   406.     Id.  at  1126.  
   407.     Id.  at  1039-­‐‑40.  
   408.     Mike  E.  Jorgensen,  Is  Today  the  Day  We  Free  Electroconvulsive  Therapy?,  12  
QUINNIPIAC  HEALTH  L.J.  1,  39  n.234  (2008)  (quoting  In  re  Branning,  674  N.E.2d  463,  
468  (Ill.  App.  Ct.  1996),  “The  two  fundamental  concerns'ʹ  that  led  the  Supreme  Court  
of  Illinois  to  find  a  fundamental  liberty  interest  in  refusing  psychotropic  medication  
are  present  in  regard  to  performing  ECT.    The  first,  that  the  treatment  is  of  a  
‘substantially  invasive  nature’  and  has  ‘significant  side  effects'ʹ....”).  
   409.     Id  at  3.  
   410.     Helia  Garrido  Hull,  Electroconvulsive  Therapy:  Baby  Boomers  May  Be  in  for  the  
Shock  of  Their  Lives,  47  U.  LOUISVILLE  L.  REV.  241,  251  (2008).  
   411.     See  Id.  
   412.     CAL.  WELF.  &  INST.  CODE  §  5325(g-­‐‑h)  (West  2014).  
   413.     Henry  T.  Greeley,  Neuroscience  and  Criminal  Justice:  Not  Responsibility  but  
Treatment,  56  U.  KAN.  L.  REV.  1103,  1111  (2008).  
   414.     Id.  at  1112.  
CLAUSEN  (DO  NOT  DELETE)   10/1/15    10:27  AM  
56   MARQUETTE  ELDER’S  ADVISOR   [Vol.  16.1  
 
very  mentally  ill  patients  when  other  treatments  have  failed.415  
Florida   extensively   regulates   both   psychosurgery   and  
ECT.416     The  Baker  Act  prohibits  a  guardian  from  consenting  to  
the   patient’s   ECT   or   psychosurgery   “[u]nless   the   guardian   .   .   .  
has   sought   and   received   express   court   approval   in   [a]   proceeding  
separate  from  the  proceeding  to  determine  the  competence  of  the  
patient   to   consent   to   medical   treatment.”417      “The   court   must  
base   its   decision   [whether   to   authorize   ECT   or   psychosurgery]  
on   evidence   [demonstrating]   that   the   [given]   treatment   or  
procedure   is   essential   to   the   care   of   the   patient   and   that   the  
treatment   does   not   present   an   unreasonable   risk   of   serious,  
hazardous,   or   irreversible   side   effects.”418      For   both   ECT   and  
psychosurgery,   Florida   law   requires   a   physician   to   obtain   the  
prior  written  consent  of  the  patient  after  disclosure  to  the  patient  
of   the   purpose   of   the   procedure,   the   common   side   effects,  
alternative   treatment  modalities,   and   the   approximate   number  
of   procedures   considered   necessary.419      It   further   requires   that  
any  consent  may  be  revoked  by  the  patient  prior  to  or  between  
treatments.420      If   the  patient   is  not   competent,   these  disclosures  
must  be  made  to  the  guardian.421    Before  the  doctor  administers  
psychosurgery   or   ECT,   he  must   review   the   patient’s   treatment  
record   and   another   physician,   not   directly   involved   with   the  
patient,   must   agree   with   the   proposed   treatment.422      The   two  
doctors  must  document  and  sign  their  agreement  in  the  patient’s  
medical  records.423  
In  light  of  these  strict  regulations,  Florida’s  generic  directive  
 
   415.     BENJAMIN  J.  SADOCK  ET  AL.,  KAPLAN  &  SADOCK'ʹS  COMPREHENSIVE  
TEXTBOOK  OF  PSYCHIATRY  1914  (9th  ed.  2009).  
   416.     FLA.  STAT.  §§  394.4598(6),  458.325  (2013).  
   417.     Id.  §  394.4598(6)  (2013).  
   418.     Id.  
   419.     Id.  §  458.325.  
   420.     Id.  
   421.     Id.  
   422.     Id.  
   423.     Id.  
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statute   is   misleading.424      This   is   because   Florida’s   generic  
directive  statute  states,  “Unless  the  principal  expressly  delegates  
such  authority  to  the  surrogate  in  writing,  or  a  surrogate  .  .  .  has  
sought  and  received  court  approval  .  .  .  a  surrogate  .  .  .  may  not  
provide  consent  for:  [ECT  and  psychosurgery].”425     Considering  
the  Baker  Act  requirement  for  court  approval  in  each  instance  in  
which   a   guardian   approves   ECT   or   psychosurgery,426   “or”   in  
Florida’s   generic   directive   statute   should   be   “and.”427    
Interpreting   Florida’s   current   generic   directive   statute   to  
authorize   Ulysses   arrangements   for   ECT   or   psychosurgery  
exposes   mental   health   patients   to   significant   risks.      This   is  
because   the   Florida   generic   directive   statute   requires   the  
principal’s  express  written  authority  to  authorize  a  surrogate  to  
consent  to  the  patient’s  ECT  or  psychosurgery.428    Implied  in  this  
requirement   is   a   grant   of   authority   to   surrogates   to   consent   to  
the   patient’s   ECT   or   psychosurgery   if   the   patient   expressly  
authorizes.429      Every   Florida   patient   who   executes   a   directive  
necessarily  creates  a  directive  that  is  irrevocable  when  she  lacks  
capacity.430    If,  from  this  irrevocability  fact  alone,  one  interpreted  
the   Florida   generic   directive   statute   to   authorize   Ulysses  
arrangements,   patients   would   be   at   risk   of   being   subject   to  
highly   intrusive   mental   health   treatments   despite   their  
objections.  
For   example,   Patient   designates   Surrogate   and   expressly  
authorizes   Surrogate   to   consent   to   Patient’s   ECT   and/or  
psychosurgery.      If   one   interpreted   Florida’s   generic   directive  
statute   to   authorize   Ulysses   arrangements,   Surrogate   could  
consent   to   Patient’s   ECT   and/or   psychosurgery   when   Patient  
 
   424.     See  Id.  §  765.113(1).  
   425.     Id.  §765.113  (emphasis  added).  
   426.     Id.  §  394.4598(6).  
   427.     Id.  §  765.113.  
   428.     Id.  
   429.     Id.  
   430.     Id.  §  765.104.  
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lacks  capacity  even  if  Patient  adamantly  refuses.431    Considering  
psychosurgery   is   dangerous   and   discredited,   and   ECT   is  
intrusive   and   controversial,   no   surrogate   should   have   the  
authority  to  authorize  either  treatment,  especially  without  court  
authority,   when   a   patient   objects.      Ulysses   arrangements   are  
inappropriate   for   psychosurgery   and   unwise   for   ECT.      Rather,  
the   patient   can   form   a   Ulysses   arrangement   for   less   intrusive  
pharmaceutical   and   inpatient   treatment   until   she   regains  
capacity.     With  capacity,  she  can  decide  for  herself  whether  she  
needs  psychosurgery  or  ECT.  
Despite   its   shortcomings,   Washington’s   statute   is   a   good  
starting  point   for   a  process   governing   the   admission  of  mental  
health   patients   pursuant   to   irrevocable   directives   in  
contravention   of   contemporaneous   objections.432      However,  
probably  because  Washington  does  not   truly  authorize  Ulysses  
arrangements,433  Washington  neglects  to  set  forth  procedures  for  
administering   medication   pursuant   to   an   irrevocable   directive  
when   the   patient   objects.434      Part   III   recommends   how   Florida  
should  address  administering  medication  pursuant  to  a  Ulysses  
arrangement  and  prohibiting  Ulysses  arrangements  for  ECT  and  
psychosurgery.435  
c. Patients  Cannot  Designate  Activation  Standard  
Activation  refers  to  the  point  at  which  the  directive  governs  
the   patient’s   care.436      In   Florida,   the   directive   becomes   active  
when   the   patient   loses   capacity.437      The   directive   no   longer  
governs  care  once  the  patient  regains  capacity.438    Therefore,  the  
patient’s   surrogate  makes   health   care   decisions   for   the   patient  
 
   431.     Id.  §765.113.  
   432.     WASH.  REV.  CODE  §  71.32.140  (2014).  
   433.     Id.  §  71.32.140(6)(b).  
   434.     Id.  §  71.32.140.  
   435.     See  infra  Part  III.  
   436.     Clausen,  supra  note  1,  at  62;  VHA  REPORT,  supra  note  1,  at  8.  
   437.     FLA.  STAT.  §  765.204(3)  (2013).  
   438.     Id.  
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only   after   the   patient   loses   capacity   –   not   before.439      This  
incapacity  activation  standard  is  far  preferable  for  mental  health  
patients  to  an  involuntary  placement  standard.440     If  a  patient  is  
forced   to   wait   for   intervention   until   she   meets   involuntary  
placement  criteria,  intervention  will  likely  come  too  late.441  
If   a   patient’s   capacity   is   in   question,   Florida’s   generic  
directive  statute  requires  the  attending  physician  to  evaluate  the  
patient’s   capacity   and   enter   that   evaluation   in   the   patient’s  
record.442      If   the   attending   physician   has   any   question   as   to  
whether  the  principal  lacks  capacity,  the  statute  requires  another  
doctor   to   evaluate   the   patient’s   capacity   and   agree   the   patient  
lacks  capacity  before  the  directive  becomes  active.443  
Determining  incapacity  is  difficult  because  capacity  is  fluid  
for   mental   health   patients,   and   a   physician   capacity  
determination   takes   time.444      These   delays,   although   not   as  
significant  as  delays   involved   in  court  hearings  and  rulings   for  
involuntary   placement,   still   postpone   intervention.445      For   this  
reason,   some   states   have   empowered   patients   to   create  
directives   that   take  effect  before  patients   lose   capacity.446     Even  
in   these   states,   a   patient   with   capacity   may   override   her  
directive   or   the   instructions   of   her   surrogate.447      This   is   called  
early   activation   because   it   allows   the   directive   to   govern   care  
even   before   a   physician   has   determined   the   patient   has   lost  
capacity.448      The   patient   designates   the   circumstances   under  
which  her  directive  becomes  active.449  
 
   439.     Id.  
   440.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.467,  394.4655  (2013).  
   441.     See  supra  text  accompanying  note  194.  
   442.     FLA.  STAT.  §  765.204(2)  (2013).  
   443.     Id.  
   444.     Clausen,  supra  note  1,  at  39.  
   445.     Id.  
   446.     VHA  Report,  supra  note  1,  at  8;  N.J.  STAT.  ANN.  §  26:2H-­‐‑108  (West  2013);  
N.M.  STAT.  ANN.  §  24-­‐‑7B-­‐‑4  (2014);  20  PA.  CONS.  STAT.  §  5825  (2013).  
   447.     VHA  Report,  supra  note  1,  at  8.  
   448.     Id.  
   449.     Id.  
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For   example,   consider  Moraes   v.   New   Horizons   of   Treasure  
Coast,   Inc.,   the   case   discussed   above   in   which   Mariangela  
committed  suicide  after  she  was  released  from  the  hospital,  but  
was   still   suffering   from   an   episode   that   caused   paranoid  
delusions.450      Maybe   the   suicide   could   have   been   prevented   if  
Mariangela,   when   she   had   capacity,   could   have   formed   a  
Ulysses   arrangement,   which   by   its   terms   became   active   when  
her   son   executed   a   sworn   affidavit   asserting   she   was   having  
paranoid   delusions   and   describing   evidence   of   the   delusions.    
Then,   after   activation,   the   arrangement   could   have   required  
three  weeks  hospitalization  even  if  she  did  not  meet  involuntary  
placement   criteria   and   demanded   discharge.      This   is   patient  
designated  activation  because  the  Ulysses  arrangement  becomes  
active  under   the  circumstances  Mariangela  describes   instead  of  
after   a   physician   has   determined   she   has   lost   capacity.    
Mariangela,  who  physically   resisted  police  officers’   attempts   to  
hospitalize  her  under  the  Baker  Act,451  would  have  refused  to  see  
her   psychiatrist   for   a   capacity   evaluation   in   the   midst   of   an  
episode.      Therefore,   the   incapacity   activation   standard   would  
not  have  worked  for  Mariangela.    She  needed  early  activation.  
Patient   designated   activation   enables   patients   who   best  
understand  the  patterns  of  their  mental  illnesses  to  obtain  early  
intervention   to  prevent  a  mental  health  crisis.452     By  preventing  
early  activation  of  directives,  Florida  does  not  allow  patients  to  
create  individualized  prevention  plans.453  
As   explored   in   Part   III,   Florida   should   enact   a   Ulysses  
arrangement  enabling  statute  that  authorizes  patients  to  specify  
the   criteria   upon   which   their   Ulysses   arrangements   become  
 
   450.     Moraes  v.  New  Horizons  of  the  Treasure  Coast,  2013  U.S.  Dist.  LEXIS  
109552  (S.D.  Fla.  Aug.  5,  2013).  
   451.     Id.  
   452.     Early  activation  is  controversial  because  it  creates  opportunities  for  
coercion.    However,  patients  should  have  the  power  to  create  individualized  
intervention  plans.    For  this  reason,  it  is  important  the  physician,  patient,  and  
surrogate  are  sure  of  what  the  mental  health  crisis  prevention  plan  entails.    See  
VHA  Report,  supra  note  1,  at  8.  
   453.     See  FLA.  STAT.  §  765.204(3)  (2013).  
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active.    However,  after  a  patient  arrives  at  a  facility  and  refuses  
treatment,   the   enabling   statute   should   require   a   physician   to  
assess  capacity.     If  the  patient  has  capacity,  the  enabling  statute  
should  prohibit  administration  of   treatment   in  contravention  of  
the  patient’s  refusals,  even  if  such  treatment  is  requested  in  the  
Ulysses   arrangement.      This   helps   address   concerns   about   a  
patient’s   change   of   heart   or   unanticipated   contingencies.454    
Ulysses  arrangements  only  support  patient  autonomy  if  patients  
with  capacity  are  free  to  change  their  minds.  
d. No  Transportation  Option  
The   final   reason   Florida,   either   through   the   generic  
directive   statute   or   the  Baker  Act,   fails   to   empower  patients   to  
form  and  effectuate  Ulysses  arrangements  is  Florida  provides  no  
means   for   a   patient   to   secure   involuntary   transportation   to  
implement   a   Ulysses   arrangement.455      Florida   is   not   unique   in  
this  failure.    Research  uncovered  no  state  statute  empowering  a  
patient  to  arrange  for  involuntary  transportation  to  a  hospital  to  
secure  intervention  pursuant  to  her  Ulysses  arrangement.    Even  
Washington’s  statute  does  not  address  how  the  patient  arrives  at  
the  hospital.456  Part   III’s  proposed   legislative  relief  empowering  
patients   to  arrange   involuntary   transportation   to  a  hospital  can  
serve  as  a  model  for  other  states.457  
Again,   consider  Moraes   v.   New   Horizons   of   Treasure   Coast,  
Inc.,   the   case   discussed   above.458      Assume   Mariangela   had   a  
Ulysses  arrangement  that  was  properly  activated  under  its  terms  
when  her  son  executed  an  affidavit  asserting  she  was  suffering  
from  paranoid  delusions.     In  the  case,  she  convinced  her  son  to  
let  her  drive  and  she  drove  recklessly  and  dangerously.    Her  son  
 
   454.     Clausen,  supra  note  1,  at  22-­‐‑23.  
   455.     FLA.  STAT.,  ch.  765  (2013);  FLA.  STAT.,  ch.  394  (2013).  
   456.     WASH.  REV.  CODE  §  71.32.140  (2014).  
   457.     See  infra  Part  III.  
   458.     Moraes  v.  New  Horizons  of  the  Treasure  Coast,  Inc.,  2013  WL  4009438,  at  
*1  (S.D.  Fla.  Aug.  5,  2013).  
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could   not   transport   Mariangela   against   her   will   to   a   hospital  
because  doing  so  would  be  dangerous.    In  the  case,  when  police  
tried  to  involuntarily  transport  her  to  a  hospital,  she  committed  
battery  and  physically  resisted.459    Moreover,  in  Florida,  her  son  
does   not   have   the   authority   to   involuntarily   transport   her   to   a  
hospital.  
As   explored   in   Part   I,   in   Florida,   only   a   law   enforcement  
officer   or   a   transportation   contractor   can   transport   a   refusing  
patient   to   a   receiving   facility   for   involuntary   examination.460    
Transportation   is   only   authorized   based   upon   a   finding   the  
person  meets  involuntary  examination  criteria  as  reflected  in:  (1)  
personal   recorded   observations,   (2)   an   ex   parte   order   of   the  
court,   or   (3)   a   physician’s   certificate.461      The   Baker   Act’s  
transportation   criteria   and   procedures   do   not   contemplate  
Ulysses   arrangements.462      Only   officers   and   transportation  
contractors  may  transport  to  a  facility  the  person  who  appears  to  
meet   involuntary   examination   criteria.463      The   Baker   Act   does  
not   contemplate   Ulysses   arrangements   because   the   purpose   of  
the  Ulysses  arrangement  is  to  secure  early  intervention  to  stave  
off   a   crisis   even   if   the   patient   refuses   and   does   not   meet  
involuntary   examination   criteria.464      Even   if   the   Florida  
legislature   amended   the   generic   directive   statute   to   authorize  
Ulysses  arrangements,  the  arrangements  will  prove  ineffective  if  
patients  cannot  secure  involuntary  transportation  to  a  facility.  
It  would  be   illegal   for  a  private  person,465   such  as  a   family  
member,  to  transport  a  refusing  patient  pursuant  to  the  patient’s  
Ulysses   arrangement.466      For   example,   in  Administrator,   Retreat  
 
   459.     Id.  
   460.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.462  (2013).  
   461.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.463  (2013).  
   462.     Fla.  Stat.  §§  394.462,  394.463(2)  (2013).  
   463.     Id.  §  394.463.  
   464.     See  FLA.  STAT.  §  394.453  (2013).  
   465.     Of  course  transportation  contractors  may  do  so.  See  FLA.  STAT.  §  394.453  
(2013).  
   466.     See  FLA.  STAT.  §  394.462  (2013).  
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Hospital  v.  Johnson  In  and  For  Broward  County.,  the  Fourth  DCA  of  
Florida   clarified  only   an  officer   (and  now  also   a   transportation  
contractor)  may  detain  and  transport  a  patient  under   the  Baker  
Act.467      The   Baker  Act   prohibits   private   parties   from   detaining  
and   transporting   a  patient   for   involuntary   examination.468     Not  
just   any  officer  may   transport   the  person  who  appears   to  meet  
involuntary  examination  criteria.    The  Florida  Attorney  General  
opined   the   Baker   Act   only   authorizes   municipal   police  
department  officers  (and  now  also  transportation  contractors)  to  
transport   patients   to   receiving   facilities   for   involuntary  
examination.469      University   police   do   not   have   the   authority.470    
Moreover,   federal   law   enforcement   officers   are   not   law  
enforcement  officers  for  the  purposes  of  the  Baker  Act  and  have  
no   authority   under   the   Act   to   initiate   the   involuntary  
examination  of   a  person  or   to   transport   the  person   to  a   facility  
for  involuntary  examination.471  
Under   current   Florida   law,   even   police   officers   and  
transportation   contractors   may   not   transport   a   person   to   a  
facility   who   does   not   meet   involuntary   examination   criteria.472    
Therefore,  to  truly  enable  patients  to  form  and  effectuate  Ulysses  
arrangements,  Florida  should  adopt  the  recommended  approach  
in   Part   III,   which   allows   patients   to   secure   involuntary  
transportation.473  
However,   there   are   risks   in   allowing   patients   to   secure  
 
   467.     Administrator,  Retreat  Hospital  v.  Johnson,  660  So.2d  333,  340  (Fla.  Dist.  
Ct.  App.  1995).  
   468.     Id.;  FLA.  STAT.  §  394.462  (2013).  
   469.     Advisory  Legal  Opinion  -­‐‑  AGO  74-­‐‑108,  Costs  of  Transporting  Mental  
Patients,  FLORIDA  OFFICE  OF  THE  ATTORNEY  GENERAL  (April  9,  1974),  
http://www.myfloridalegal.com/ago.nsf/Opinions/3CDA1409B57941FB852566B2005
7A07D.  
   470.     See  Id.  
   471.     Advisory  Legal  Opinion  -­‐‑  AGO  99-­‐‑68,  FLORIDA  OFFICE  OF  THE  ATTORNEY  
GENERAL  (NOV.  8,  1999),  
http://www.myfloridalegal.com/ago.nsf/Opinions/3F509A3A10AB248985256824007
59885.  
   472.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.462(1)  (2013).  
   473.     See  infra  Part  III.  
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involuntary  transportation  to  a  facility  to  effectuate  their  Ulysses  
arrangements.      First,   police   apprehension   of   mental   health  
patients  can  be  dangerous.    For  example,  in  Drummond  v.  City  of  
Anaheim,   police   responded   to   Drummond’s   fiancée’s   call   that  
Drummond,   diagnosed   with   schizophrenia   and   bipolar  
disorder,  was  in  need  of  involuntary  examination.474    Ultimately,  
police   apprehension   resulted   in   police   brutalizing   a   passive  
Drummond,   leaving   him   in   a   permanent   vegetative   state.475    
Second,   empowering   patients   to   use   Ulysses   arrangements   to  
secure  involuntary  transportation  creates  more  opportunities  for  
loved  ones  to  use  the  Ulysses  arrangement  as  a  coercive  tool  to  
force  treatment  on  a  vulnerable  patient.476    Third,  responding  to  
requests   to   transport   patients   pursuant   to   their   Ulysses  
arrangements  could  cause  a  drain  on  law  enforcement  resources  
and   divert   law   enforcement   from   other   emergencies.      Florida  
must   take   steps   to   prevent   people   from   “crying   wolf”   and  
harassing  police  when   there   is   no   true  mental   health   crisis.     A  
Ulysses   enabling   statute,   which   provides   patients   with   the  
involuntary  transportation  option,  must  safeguard  against  such  
abuse  and  protect  patient   safety.     As   explored  below,  Part   III’s  
recommended  approach  has  such  protective  measures.  
III.  SOLUTION:  BRING  ULYSSES  TO  FLORIDA  
This   Section  urges   the  Florida   legislature   to   amend   the  Florida  
generic   directive   statute   to   authorize  mental   health   patients   to  
form  and  effectuate  Ulysses  arrangements.477    Currently,  Florida  
 
   474.     Drummond  v.  City  of  Anaheim,  343  F.3d  1052,  1054  (2003).  
   475.     Id.  at  1055.  
   476.     Advance  Directive  Instruments,  supra  note  212,  at  87.  
   477.     Clausen,  supra  note  1,  Appendix  A  (recommending  a  model  statute  for  the  
Uniform  Law  Commissioners  which  also  contained  provisions  enabling  Ulysses  
arrangements.    This  model  statute  was  the  inspiration  for  the  described  statute  in  
this  Article.    However,  this  Article'ʹs  described  statute  improves  on  the  previous  
model  statute  by  authorizing  patients  to  arrange  for  involuntary  transportation.    
This  feature  was  not  present  in  the  previous  model  and  requires  amendment  of  
involuntary  placement  law  as  well  as  advance  directive  law  because  of  the  
involvement  of  police).  
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does   not   empower   patients   to   form   Ulysses   arrangements.478    
First,   Florida’s   generic   directive   statute   fails   to   empower  
patients  to  determine  whether  their  directives  will  be  irrevocable  
when   they   lack   capacity.479      Second,   the   statute   provides   no  
safeguards   to   ensure   patients   form   Ulysses   arrangements  
voluntarily.480      Third,   the   statute   has   no   process   governing  
administration   of   treatment   in   contravention   of  
contemporaneous  refusals.481    Finally,  there  is  no  mechanism  for  
a   patient   to   arrange   for   transportation   to   a   hospital   to   obtain  
intervention  once  an  episode  has  caused  treatment  refusals.482  
Section  III  (A)  below  recommends  changes  (to  the  “General  
Provisions”   (Part   I)   portion   of   Florida’s   generic   directive  
statute483)   which   define   Ulysses   arrangements   and   make  
legislative  findings  concerning  the  need  for  such  arrangements.    
Sections  III  (B-­‐‑C)  below  propose  legislative  relief,  which  ensures  
Ulysses   arrangements   are   formed   knowingly   and   voluntarily  
and   defines   a   clear   process   for   implementation   of   such  
arrangements.     This   legislative   relief   should  be   incorporated  as  
Part  VI  of  Florida’s  generic  directive  statute,  which  currently  has  
five   parts.484      Proposed   Part   VI   of   the   generic   directive   statute  
should  be  entitled  “Mental  Health  Advance  Directives”  because  
the   generic   directive   statute   fails   to   give   guidance   on   mental  
health  directives.485    Proposed  Part  VI  should  contain  provisions  
concerning  all  aspects  of  mental  health  directives.     Because  this  
Article   addresses   only   Ulysses   arrangements,   the   text   below  
recommends   provisions   related   only   to   Ulysses   arrangements.    
Providing   patients   the   involuntary   transportation   option   will  
require   the   Florida   legislature   not   only   to   amend   Florida’s  
 
   478.     See  supra  Part  II(B).  
   479.     Id.  at  note  283.  
   480.     Id.  at  note  284.  
   481.     Id.  at  note  285.  
   482.     Id.  at  note  286.  
   483.     FLA.  STAT.,  ch.  765  (2013);  Part  I.  
   484.     FLA.  STAT.,  ch.  765  (2013).  
   485.     See  supra  Part  II(B).  
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generic  directive  statute  but  also  the  involuntary  examination486  
and  transportation487  provisions  of  the  Baker  Act.  
A.  LEGISLATIVE  FINDINGS  AND  DEFINITIONS  
Part  I  of  Florida’s  generic  directive  statute  contains  all  of  the  
definitions   and   legislative   findings   related   to   advance  
directives.488      The   Florida   legislature   should   amend   Part   I   to  
define  a  Ulysses  arrangement  as:  a  special  type  of  mental  health  
directive   through   which   a   patient   authorizes   doctors   to  
administer   treatment   during   a   future   mental   illness   episode  
even   (1)   in   contravention   of   the   patient’s   illness-­‐‑induced  
refusals,   (2)   if   the   patient   lacks   capacity   to   provide   informed  
consent,   and   (3)   if   the   patient   does   not   meet   involuntary  
examination  criteria  under  the  Baker  Act.489  
The   Florida   legislature   should   amend   the   legislative  
findings   to   recognize   that   mental   illness   episodes   can   cause  
people  to  refuse  treatment  to  which  they  would  consent   if   they  
were   unimpaired.      Allowing   such   patients   to   create   Ulysses  
arrangements   to   overcome   illness-­‐‑induced   refusals   protects  
patient  safety,  autonomy,  and  health.    These  legislative  findings  
would   notify   all   stakeholders   that   supporting   Ulysses  
arrangements  empowers  patients  to  prevent  crisis.  
B.  ENSURE  FORMATION  IS  VOLUNTARY  
The   text   below  describes  provisions   the  Florida   legislature  
should   adopt   to   ensure   Ulysses   arrangement   formation   is  
voluntary  and  knowing.    The  Florida  legislature  should  include  
these   provisions   in   a   proposed   Part   VI   of   Florida’s   generic  
directive  statute.  
 
   486.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.463  (2013).  
   487.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.462  (2013).  
   488.     FLA.  STAT.  §§  394.453,  394.455  (2013).  
   489.     Sheetz,  supra  note  3,  at  403.  
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1. Empower  Patients  to  Decide  Whether  They  Can  Revoke  
A  patient  cannot  form  a  Ulysses  arrangement  unless  she  has  
the   right   to   form  a  directive   that   is   irrevocable  when   she   lacks  
capacity.490      However,   Ulysses   arrangements   are   only  
appropriate   for  patients  who  have   the   right   to   choose  whether  
their  directives  will  be  revocable  when  they  lack  capacity.491    The  
primary   reason   the   Florida   generic   directive   statute   deprives  
patients   of   the  Ulysses   arrangement   tool   is   its   requirement   for  
competence   for   a   patient   to   revoke   or   amend   a   directive.492    
Patients   who   do   not   have   the   power   to   choose   whether   their  
directives   should   be   revocable  when   they   lack   capacity   cannot  
voluntarily  form  a  Ulysses  arrangement.493  
Proposed   Part   VI   of   the   generic   directive   statute   should  
contain   a   provision   that   requires   the   principal   to   designate  
whether   she   wants   to   be   able   to   revoke   her   mental   health  
directive  when  she  lacks  capacity.    Failure  to  clarify  whether  the  
mental   health   directive   is   revocable   should   not   render   it  
unenforceable.      Rather,   if   the   mental   health   directive   fails   to  
address   revocation  without  capacity,   the  patient   should  be   free  
to  revoke  at  any  time.    The  provision  should  explain  that  opting  
to  make  a  mental  health  directive  irrevocable  during  periods  of  
incapacity   forms   a   Ulysses   arrangement.      This   proposed  
provision  helps  ensure  patients  contemplate  whether  they  want  
to  form  Ulysses  arrangements  and  do  not  inadvertently  do  so.494  
2. Require  Signed,  Witnessed  Writing  
It   is   unclear   in   Florida   whether   a   principal   may   orally  
 
   490.   See  supra  Part  II(B)(2)(a).  
   491.     Id.  
   492.     FLA.  STAT.  §  765.104(1)  (2013).  
   493.     See  supra  Part  II(B)(2)(a).  
   494.     See  supra  note  477  (providing  a  model  provision  similar  to  this  as  a  
proposed  amendment  to  the  Uniform  Healthcare  Decisions  Act).  
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designate  a  surrogate  or  issue  health  care  instructions.495    This  is  
because  Florida’s  advance  directive  definition  implies  principals  
may   orally   issue   instructions   and   designate   surrogates.496    
However,   the   generic   directive   statute   requires   written  
documents  designating  a  surrogate  to  be  signed  by  the  principal  
in  the  presence  of  witnesses.497  
Proposed   Part   VI   of   the   Florida   generic   directive   statute  
should  contain  a  provision  requiring  Ulysses  arrangements  to  be  
in  writing  and  signed  by  the  principal.    The  proposed  provision  
should  require  the  principal’s  affirmation  that  the  principal  was  
aware   of   the   nature   of   the   document   and   signed   freely   and  
voluntarily.    The  provision  should  require  Ulysses  arrangements  
to  be  witnessed  in  writing  by  at  least  two  adults.    Neither  of  the  
witnesses   should   be   (1)   on   the   principal’s   treatment   team;   (2)  
related  to  the  principal  by  blood,  adoption,  or  marriage;  (3)  in  a  
romantic  relationship  with  the  principal;  (4)  the  surrogate  of  the  
principal;  or  (5)  the  owner,  operator,  employee,  or  relative  of  an  
owner  or  operator  of  a  treatment  facility   in  which  the  principal  
is  a  patient.    The  provision  should  require  the  witnesses  to  attest  
the   following   three   facts:   (1)   they   were   present   when   the  
principal   signed;   (2)   the  principal  did  not   appear   incapacitated  
or   under   undue   influence   or   duress  when   signing;   and   (3)   the  
principal   presented   identification   or   the   witness   personally  
knows   the   principal.498      These   Ulysses   arrangement   execution  
requirements   safeguard   against   health   care   fraud,  
misinterpretation  of  patient  wishes,  undue  influence,  abuse,  and  
coercion.499  
 
   495.     See  supra  note  295.  
   496.     FLA.  STAT.  §  765.101(1)  (2013).  
   497.     Id.  §  765.202(1).  
   498.     See  supra  p.  162  and  note  477,  at  Appendix  A  (providing  similar  language  
for  a  recommended  mental  health  directive  statute  for  the  Uniform  Law  
Commissioners).  
   499.     See  supra  Part  II(B)(2)(b).  
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3. Mandate  Capacity  Assessment  and  Attestation  
In   Florida,   unless   the   principal’s   capacity   is   in   question,  
there  is  no  requirement  for  a  capacity/competency  assessment  at  
the   time   of   directive   formation.500     Moreover,   “Incapacity  may  
not  be  inferred  from  .  .  .  voluntary  or  involuntary  hospitalization  
for  mental   illness.”501     Proposed  Part  VI  of   the  generic  directive  
statute   should   contain   a   provision   requiring   a   written,   signed  
attestation   from  a  mental   health  professional   that   the  principal  
had   capacity   at   the   time   of   Ulysses   arrangement   formation.502    
Ulysses  arrangements  are  instruments  of  self-­‐‑paternalism,  which  
create  opportunities   for   family  and  clinicians   to  coerce  patients  
to  accept  a   treatment   regimen.503     Doctors  administer   treatment  
pursuant   to   the   arrangement   without   procedural   protections  
involved  in  involuntary  placement.504    Capacity  is  often  fluid  for  
mental   health   patients   because   episodes   disrupt   capacity.505     A  
capacity   assessment   helps   address   these   concerns   because   it  
helps   ensure   the   patient   voluntarily   formed   the   arrangement  
when  she  had  capacity,   free   from  the  undue   influence  of   loved  
ones  and  clinicians  or  an  episode.506  
4. Provide  for  Automatic  Expiration  
Florida   does   not   provide   for   automatic   expiration   of  
directives.507      Automatic   expiration   is   warranted   for   Ulysses  
arrangements   for   a   few   reasons.      First,   automatic   expiration  
addresses   the   concern   that   Ulysses   arrangements   provide  
 
   500.     FLA.  STAT.  §  765.204(1)-­‐‑(2)  (2013).  
   501.     Id.  §  765.204(1)  (2013).  
   502.     See  supra  p.  162  and  note  477,  at  Appendix  A  (providing  a  model  provision  
similar  to  this  as  a  proposed  amendment  to  the  Uniform  Health-­‐‑Care  Decisions  
Act).  
   503.     Advance  Directive  Instruments,  supra  note  212,  at  87-­‐‑88;  Dresser,  supra  note  
202,  at  851-­‐‑852.  
   504.     Dresser,  supra  note  202,  at  800.  
   505.     Clausen,  supra  note  1,  at  39.  
   506.     Id.;  Cuca,  supra  note  255,  at,  1171-­‐‑1172;  Dresser,  supra  note  202,  at  851-­‐‑852.  
   507.     FLA.  STAT.  §  765.202(6)  (2013).  
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expired,   outdated   informed   consent.508      Automatic   expiration  
ensures   consent   is   relatively   recent.509      Second,   “automatic  
expiration   helps   address   concerns   [over   the   possibility   of]  
unanticipated  consequences  due  to  a  patient’s  change  of  heart  or  
failure   to”   predict   contingencies.510      This   is   because   automatic  
expiration   requires   patients   and   doctors   to   periodically  
reevaluate   the  need  for  self-­‐‑binding   intervention  and  to  update  
treatment  protocols.511    Proposed  Part  VI  of  the  generic  directive  
statute   should   contain   a   provision   providing   for   automatic  
expiration   of   Ulysses   arrangements   two   years   after   execution  
unless  the  principal  reaffirms  the  arrangement.      If   the  principal  
is   incapacitated   at   the   end   of   the   two-­‐‑year   time   frame,   the  
Ulysses  arrangement  should  remain  in  effect  until   the  principal  
regains  capacity  —  when  she  can  decide  whether  to  reaffirm  the  
arrangement  or  not.512  
C.  DEFINE  PROCESS  FOR  IMPLEMENTATION  
This  Section  outlines  proposed  legislative  relief  that  defines  
safeguards   and   a   clear   process   for   implementing   Ulysses  
arrangements   that   the  Florida   legislature   should   incorporate  as  
provisions   in   Part  VI   of   Florida’s   generic   directive   statute.      To  
effectuate   their   Ulysses   arrangements,   patients   will   need   to  
arrange   for   involuntary   transportation.      Providing   such   an  
option   requires   the   Florida   legislature   not   only   to   amend   the  
Florida   generic   directive   statute,513   but   also   the   Baker   Act’s  
provisions  for  involuntary  evaluation  and  transportation.514  
 
   508.     Dresser,  supra  note  202,  at  830-­‐‑832.  
   509.     Clausen,  supra  note  1,  at  43.  
   510.     Clausen,  supra  note  1,  at  42.  
   511.     See  supra  note  477.  
   512.     Id.  
   513.     FLA.  STAT.,  ch.  765  (2013).  
   514.     FLA.  STAT.  §§  394.462,  394.463(1)  (2013).  
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1. Provide  for  Patient  Designated  Activation  and  
Transportation  Option  
Proposed   Part   VI   of   the   generic   directive   statute   should  
contain  provisions  empowering  a  principal   to   (1)  designate  her  
directive’s   activation   standard,   and   (2)   secure   involuntary  
transportation   to   a   hospital   to   effectuate   her   Ulysses  
arrangement.      Currently   in   Florida,   directives   only   become  
active   after   the   principal   loses   capacity.515      Florida   does   not  
authorize   a   principal   to   designate   an   activation   standard   other  
than  incapacity.516    This  failure  prevents  patients  from  obtaining  
early   intervention.517      Under   Florida   law,   a   patient   who  
expresses  illness-­‐‑induced  refusals  but  does  not  meet  involuntary  
examination  criteria  has  no  mechanism  to  obtain  intervention.518    
Only   an   officer   or   transportation   contractor   may   transport   a  
patient   who   appears   to   meet   the   criteria   for   involuntary  
examination  to  a  receiving  facility.519  
If   Florida   adopts   the   recommendations   explored   below,   it  
will   move   to   the   forefront   of   patient   empowerment   and   crisis  
prevention.      Proposed   Part   VI   of   the   generic   directive   statute  
will   serve  as  a  model   for  other   states.     Proposed  Part  VI  of   the  
generic   directive   statute   should   safeguard   against   abuse   and  
articulate   a   clear   process   as   follows.      First,   all   patients   should  
have   the  authority   to  designate   the  activation  standard  of   their  
directives.      Unless   the   principal   otherwise   designates   in   the  
directive,   the   directive   shall   become   active  when   the   principal  
loses  capacity.     To  prevent   involuntary  treatment  of  a  principal  
with   capacity,   the  provision   should   clarify  a  directive  does  not  
prevail   over   contemporaneous   preferences   expressed   by   a  
principal  with  capacity.520  
 
   515.     Id.  §  765.204(2)-­‐‑(3).  
   516.     Id.  §  765.204(3).  
   517.     See  supra  Part  II(B)(3)(c).  
   518.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.463(1)  (2013).  
   519.     Id.  §§  394.462(1)(a),  394.463(1).  
   520.     See  supra  p.  162  and  note  477.  
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Second,  Part  VI  shall  give  every  patient  the  right  to  arrange  
for   involuntary   transportation   to   effectuate   her   Ulysses  
arrangement.521      Only   patients   who   specifically   request  
involuntary   transportation   in   their   Ulysses   arrangements   shall  
be   subject   to   involuntary   transportation,   unless   they   meet  
involuntary   examination   criteria   under   the   Baker   Act.522      A  
patient   who   wants   to   arrange   for   involuntary   transportation  
must  designate  a  surrogate   to  whom  the  patient  grants  express  
authority  to  consent  to  the  patient’s  involuntary  transportation  if  
the   directive   becomes   active.523      When   the   directive   becomes  
active,   the   surrogate   shall   execute   a   written,   sworn   affidavit  
stating   the  directive  has  become  active  and  disclosing   the  basis  
upon  which  the  surrogate  made  this  conclusion.     The  surrogate  
shall   then   petition   the   court   for   an   ex   parte   order   authorizing  
involuntary   transportation   and   attach   the   affidavit   and   the  
directive.524    The  court  shall  review  the  petition  and  attachments  
within  forty-­‐‑eight  hours  after  submission.525     Within  such  forty-­‐‑
eight   hour   period,   the   court   shall   issue   an   ex   parte   order   for  
transportation   if   the   court   finds   by   clear   and   convincing  
evidence   the   directive   (1)   has   become   active,   and   (2)   requests  
involuntary  transportation.526  
Just   as   under   the   Baker   Act,   Part   VI’s   involuntary  
transportation   provision   should   clarify:   Officers   operating   in  
accordance   with   a   court   order   authorizing   involuntary  
transportation   pursuant   to   a   Ulysses   arrangement   “may   use  
such   reasonable   physical   force   as   is   necessary   to   gain   entry   to  
the  premises,  and  any  dwellings,  .  .  .  on  the  premises,  and  take  .  .  
.   custody   of   the   [patient].”527      As   with   transportation   for  
involuntary   examination   under   the   Baker   Act,   patients   should  
 
   521.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.463  (2013).  
   522.     Id.  
   523.     Id.  §  394.462(1)(a)(3).  
   524.     Id.  §  394.462.  
   525.     Id.  
   526.     Id.  
   527.     FLA.  STAT  §  394.463(2)(d)  (2013).  
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pay   for   involuntary   transportation   pursuant   to   a   Ulysses  
arrangement.528  
When   the   law   enforcement   agency   has   delegated  
transportation   responsibilities   to   transportation   contractors   in  
circumstances   outlined   by   the   Baker  Act,   the   agency  may   also  
delegate  transportation  pursuant  to  a  Ulysses  arrangement  court  
order  to  transportation  contractors.529    All  of  the  requirements  of  
the  Baker  Act  for  using  transportation  contractors  apply.530     For  
example,   transportation   contractors   may   only   transport   the  
person  if  the  jurisdiction  has  contracted  with  the  contractor,  and  
the   agency   and   the   contractor   agree   the   continued   presence   of  
law  enforcement  personnel  is  not  necessary  for  the  safety  of  the  
person   or   others.531      The   only   difference   will   be   the   Ulysses  
arrangement  based  court  order  will  authorize  the  transportation  
instead   of   a   Baker   Act   certificate   that   the   patient   meets  
involuntary  examination  criteria.  
Requirements   for   a   surrogate   affidavit   and   petition   and  
court   order   admittedly   delay   intervention.      However,   these  
delays   are   minimal   because   the   court   must   make   its  
determination   within   forty-­‐‑eight   hours   after   petition.532  
Moreover,   this  minor   delay   is  warranted   to   prevent   abuse.      A  
surrogate   affidavit   requirement   helps   ensure   involuntary  
transportation   is   what   the   patient   decided   she   needs   and  
wants.533    Only  the  patient  can  choose  her  surrogate.  She  has  the  
power   to   choose   a   surrogate   she   trusts   to   follow   her  
instructions.534      Only   the   patient   may   designate   the   directive  
activation   standard.535      This   helps   ensure   the  patient  maintains  
 
   528.     Id.  §394.462.  
   529.     FLA.  STAT.  §§  394.462,  394.463  (2013).  
   530.     Id.  
   531.     Id.  
   532.     FLA.  STAT.,  Ch.  765  (2013).  
   533.   Id.  §  394.462.  
   534.     Fla.  Dep’t  of  Children  &  Families,  TRANSPORTATION  TO  RECEIVING  
FACILITY  CF-­‐‑MH  3100  (MANDATORY  FORM)  (Feb.  2005).  By  Authority  of  FLA.  STAT.  
§  394.462(1)(a)  
   535.     Id.  
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control  over  her  transportation  and  treatment  even  in  the  midst  
of  an  episode.  
The   court   order   requirement   to   justify   involuntary  
transportation  also  helps   safeguard  against   abuse.536     The   court  
shall   review   the   directive   and   affidavit   to   ensure   there   is   clear  
and   convincing   evidence   the   directive   is   activated   and   the  
patient  wants  involuntary  transportation.537     Court   involvement  
also  helps  prevent  a  surrogate  from  “crying  wolf”  by  activating  
the   Ulysses   arrangement   before   it   becomes   active   under   its  
terms  or  squandering   law  enforcement   resources  when   there   is  
no   emergency.538      A   surrogate   who   recognizes   a   court   must  
review  her   petition   and  make   a  determination  will   likely   exert  
caution  in  activating  the  Ulysses  arrangement.539  
Therefore,  the  Florida  legislature  should  enact  Part  VI  of  the  
Florida   generic   directive   statute,   which   includes   provisions  
empowering   patients   to   arrange   for   involuntary  
transportation.540      To   notify   all   stakeholders,   the   Florida  
legislature   should   also   amend   the   Baker  Act   to   cross-­‐‑reference  
Part  VI  of   the  generic  directive  statute.      In   its  current   form,   the  
Baker   Act   only   authorizes   involuntary   transportation   if   the  
person  meets  involuntary  examination  criteria.541    The  legislature  
should   amend   the   involuntary   examination   and   transportation  
sections  of  the  Baker  Act  to  authorize  involuntary  transportation  
pursuant   to   a   court   order   based   on   Ulysses   arrangement  
activation.542      This   cross-­‐‑reference   will   help   notify   law  
enforcement   and   transportation   contractors   who   are   familiar  
with  involuntary  examination  criteria  with  which  they  routinely  
 
   536.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.463(2)  (2013)  (stating  that  a  physician’s  only  method  of  
admitting  a  patient  is  by  “executing  a  certificate  that  he  or  she  has  examined  a  
person  .  .  .  and  finds  that  the  person  appears  to  meet  the  criteria  for  involuntary  
examination”).  
   537.     FLA.  STAT.  §§  394.4655,  394.467  (2013).  
   538.     Id.  §§  394.4655,  394.467.  
   539.     Clausen,  supra  note  1  at  58.  
   540.     FLA.  STAT.,  ch.  765  (2013).  
   541.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.463  (2013).  
   542.     FLA.  STAT.  §§  394.463,  394.462  (2013).  
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work.543      Officers   need   express   authorization   to   justify  
involuntary   transportation   pursuant   to   a   court   order   based   on  
Ulysses   arrangement   activation.544      Law   enforcement   officials  
and   transportation   contractors   are   unlikely   to   be   familiar  with  
Florida   law  governing  advance  directives.545     Express   authority  
embodied   in   the   Baker   Act   is   necessary.546      Moreover,   officers  
execute  statutory  forms  when  they  transport  a  patient  based  on  
the   patient   meeting   involuntary   examination   criteria.547      The  
Florida  legislature  should  amend  the  statutory  forms  to  address  
instances   in   which   a   court   order   based   on   Ulysses   activation  
authorizes  involuntary  transportation.548  
2. Set  Forth  Procedures  for  Admission  and  Treatment  Over  
Contemporaneous  Objections  
The   legislature   should  amend   the  Florida  generic  directive  
statute  to  provide  a  process  for  treating  a  patient  pursuant  to  her  
Ulysses   arrangement,   despite   contemporaneous   objections.    
Safeguards   are   required   because   implementing   a   Ulysses  
arrangement   involves   forcibly   hospitalizing   and   treating   a  
patient   when   she   does   not   meet   commitment   criteria   and  
without  procedural  protections  afforded  in  civil  commitment.  
a. Admission  Procedures  
Under   Florida   law,   doctors   have   no   authority   to   admit   a  
patient   pursuant   to   a   Ulysses   arrangement.549      The   Ulysses  
 
   543.     FLA.  STAT.  §394.463  (2013).  
   544.     FLA.  STAT.  §§  394.462,  394.463  (2013).  
   545.     FLA.  STAT.,  ch.  765  (2013).  
   546.     FLA.  STAT.,  ch.  394  (2013).  
   547.     Fla.  Dep’t  of  Children  &  Families,  TRANSPORTATION  TO  RECEIVING  
FACILITY  CF-­‐‑MH  3100  (MANDATORY  FORM)  (Feb.  2005).  By  Authority  of  FLA.  STAT.  
§  394.462(1)(a).  
   548.     Id.  
   549.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.463(2)  (2013)  (stating  that  a  physician’s  only  method  of  
admitting  a  patient  is  by  “executing  a  certificate  that  he  or  she  has  examined  a  
person  .  .  .  and  finds  that  the  person  appears  to  meet  the  criteria  for  involuntary  
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arrangement   is   designed   to   help   the   patient  who   does   not   yet  
meet   involuntary  placement  criteria,550  but   is   in   the  midst  of  an  
episode  that  has  destroyed  her  capacity  and  caused  her  to  refuse  
admission.     The  arrangement  is  a  mechanism  for  this  patient  to  
obtain   intervention.  Currently   in  Florida,  doctors   cannot   admit  
this  patient  either  as  a  voluntary  or  involuntary  patient.551  
As   explored   in   Part   I,   the   Baker   Act   prohibits   voluntary  
admission   of   this   patient.552      “A   voluntary   patient   who   is  
unwilling  or  unable  to  provide  express  and  informed  consent  to  
mental   health   treatment   must   either   be   discharged   or  
transferred   to   involuntary   status.”553     This  patient,   in   the  midst  
of   an   episode,   lacks   the   capacity   required   to   give   informed  
consent.      Moreover,   her   illness   has   caused   her   to   refuse  
admission.554     The  physician   cannot   admit   this  patient  because,  
even  though  she  is  in  the  midst  of  an  episode,  she  does  not  meet  
involuntary  outpatient  or  inpatient  placement  criteria.555  
The  legislature  should  provide  a  process  for  admission  of  a  
patient   pursuant   to   a   Ulysses   arrangement   when   the   patient  
arrives  at  the  facility  and  voices  illness-­‐‑induced  refusals.    When  
such  a  patient  arrives  at  the  facility,  the  facility  should  obtain  the  
informed  consent  of  the  surrogate,  if  any  is  designated,  as  soon  
as  practicable.    If  law  enforcement  or  a  transportation  contractor  
transported   the  patient   to   the  hospital,   the   facility   shall   review  
and  maintain  in  the  patient’s  medical  records  a  copy  of  the  court  
order   authorizing   such   transportation.      Two   mental   health  
professionals   shall   evaluate   the   patient’s   capacity   and   record  
their   findings   in   the  patient’s  records  within   twenty-­‐‑four  hours  
of   the   patient’s   arrival.556      This   safeguard   of   a   capacity  
 
examination”).  
   550.     Id.  §§  394.4655,  394.467  (2013).  
   551.     Id.  §§  394.4655,  394.467.  
   552.     See  supra  Part  I.  
   553.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.4625(1)(e)  (2013).  
   554.     Id.  §  394.4625(1)(e-­‐‑f).  
   555.     Id.  §§  394.467,  394.4655.  
   556.     Id.  
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evaluation   from   multiple   professionals   helps   ensure   patients  
with  capacity  are  not  unduly  deprived  of  liberty.557  
Statements   in   the   directive   requesting   inpatient   treatment  
combined   with   directive   activation   and   contemporaneous  
admission   refusals   create   a   rebuttable   presumption   that   the  
patient   lacks   capacity.558      The   incapacity   presumption   helps  
doctors  assess  capacity  and  recognizes  a  patient  who  arrives  at  a  
facility  refusing  admission  requested  in  an  irrevocable  directive  
exhibits   signs   of   incapacity.559      The   purpose   of   the   Ulysses  
arrangement   is   to   empower   the   patient   to   obtain   intervention  
despite   illness-­‐‑induced   refusals.560      Without   the   incapacity  
presumption,   it   will   be   difficult   to   overcome   physician  
reluctance   to   implement   Ulysses   arrangements.      Because   they  
are   familiar   with   criteria   for   involuntary   admission,561   doctors  
will   likely  discharge  a  patient  who  does  not  meet  such  criteria,  
even   if   she   lacks   capacity   and   even   if   her   irrevocable   directive  
requests   admission.      Doctors   will   likely   try   to   insulate  
themselves   from   personal   and   professional   liability   for  
unlawfully   involuntarily   hospitalizing   a   person.562      The  
incapacity   presumption   helps   ensure   doctors   respect   the  
directive,   which   the   patient   formed   when   she   had   capacity  
instead   of   her   illness-­‐‑induced   refusals.      If,   despite   the  
presumption,  the  physician  determines  the  patient  has  capacity,  
the  facility  must  discharge  the  patient.  
b. Retention  Procedures  
Not   only   should  proposed  Part  VI   of   the   generic  directive  
statute   articulate   procedures   for   admission,   it   should   provide  
 
   557.     See  supra  p.  162  and  note  477  (providing  statutory  language  to  amend  the  
Uniform  Healthcare  Decisions  Act  which  is  substantially  similar  to  this  described  
amendment  to  Florida  law  and  is  based  on  the  Washington  approach).  
   558.     Clausen,  supra  note  1,  at  56.  
   559.     Id.  
   560.     Id.  
   561.     FLA.  STAT.  §§  394.467,  394.4655  (2013).  
   562.     See  supra  p.  123.  
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procedures  and  safeguards   for   retention  of   the  patient.     Unless  
the   hospital   follows   procedures   to   transfer   the   patient   to  
involuntary   status,563   or   the   patient   regains   capacity   and  
consents   to   voluntary   admission,   the   hospital   may   retain   the  
patient  only  for  the  time  frame  the  directive  consents  to  inpatient  
treatment.      The   hospital   may   not   retain   a   patient   without  
capacity   based   only   on   consent   provided   in   a   Ulysses  
arrangement   for   more   than   twenty-­‐‑one   days.564      After   twenty-­‐‑
one  days  from  the  date  of  admission,  regardless  of  whether  the  
patient   has   regained   capacity,   if   the   patient   refuses   treatment,  
the  facility  shall  release  the  patient  during  daylight  hours  unless  
the  patient  meets  involuntary  placement  criteria.565    Any  patient  
who   has   been   determined   to   lack   capacity   and   continues   to  
refuse   treatment   may   immediately   seek   injunctive   relief   for  
release  from  the  facility.  
These   safeguards   help   address   the   due   process   concerns  
that  Ulysses  critics  raise  about  hospitalizing  a  patient  against  her  
objections   without   procedural   protections   afforded   in   civil  
commitment.566      From   a   therapeutic   perspective,   for   many  
episodic  mental   illnesses,   three  weeks   of   inpatient   treatment   is  
long   enough   to   stabilize   the   patient   and   restore   capacity.567  
Moreover,   hospitalizing   a   person   despite   contemporaneous  
refusals  for  any  longer  would  pose  too  significant  a  deprivation  
of  liberty  when  the  person  does  not  meet  involuntary  placement  
criteria.      The   three-­‐‑week   deadline   helps   address   concerns  
Ulysses   critics   raise   about   family   and   providers   using   the  
arrangement   as   a   coercive   tool   to   force   the   patient   to   accept   a  
treatment   regimen.568      No   patient   will   be   forced   to   accept  
inpatient   treatment   to   which   she   consented   in   her   Ulysses  
arrangement  for  more  than  twenty-­‐‑one  days.  
 
   563.     FLA.  STAT.  §§  394.4655(2),  394.467(2),  394.467(7)  (2013).  
   564.     Clausen,  supra  note  1,  at  65.  
   565.     FLA.  STAT.  §§  394.4655,  394.467  (2013).  
   566.     Dresser,  supra  note  202,  at  800.  
   567.     Supra  pp.  128-­‐‑9  and  note  202.  
   568.     Advance  Directive  Instruments,  supra  note  212,  at  87-­‐‑88.  
CLAUSEN  (DO  NOT  DELETE)   10/1/15    10:27  AM  
2015]   ULYSSES  IN  FLORIDA   79  
 
c. Procedures  for  Administering  Treatment  
Florida’s   generic   directive   statute   has   no   process   for  
administering   treatment  pursuant   to   an   irrevocable  directive.569    
Interpreting   Florida’s   generic   directive   statute   to   authorize  
mental  health  treatment  to  an  incapacitated  patient  pursuant  to  
a   Ulysses   arrangement   exposes   patients   to   serious   risks   of  
abuse.570  
Proposed   Part   VI   of   the   generic   directive   statute   should  
contain  provisions  prohibiting  Ulysses  arrangements  for  ECT  or  
psychosurgery.      Psychosurgery   is   controversial,   largely  
discredited,   and   already   highly   regulated   in   Florida.571    
Psychosurgery  should  not  be  administered  pursuant  to  consent  
provided   in  an  advance  directive.572     ECT  should  not  be   forced  
on   a   refusing   patient   based   on   consent   provided   in   advance  
through  a  Ulysses  arrangement.573    This  limitation  helps  address  
concerns   about   a   patient’s   change   of   heart   or   unanticipated  
contingencies.574    ECT  has  potential  side  effects,  such  as  memory  
loss.575    There  is  too  significant  of  a  risk  that  a  patient  may  have  a  
change  of  heart  about  ECT.    This  is  why  doctors  should  respect  
contemporaneous   refusals   of   ECT,   even   from   patients   without  
capacity.  
However,   the   Ulysses   arrangement   will   be   ineffective   if  
patients   cannot   use   the   arrangement   to   override   their  
contemporaneous   refusals   of   pharmacological   therapy.      A   few  
weeks   of   pharmacological   therapy   will   enable   the   patient   to  
regain  capacity  and  prevent  a  full-­‐‑blown  mental  health  crisis.576    
Patients  should  have  the  power  to  form  Ulysses  arrangements  to  
 
   569.     See  supra  p.  146.  
   570.     Id.  
   571.     See  supra  p.  153.  
   572.     See  Advance  Directive  Instruments,  supra  note  212,  at  86.  
   573.     Supra  p.  153  and  note  410.  
   574.     Advance  Directive  Instruments,  supra  note  212,  at  87-­‐‑88.  
   575.     See  Hull,  supra  note  410  at  251.  
   576.     See  supra  p.  128  and  note  202.  
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secure   pharmacological   therapy.      Because   administering  
medication  pursuant  to  a  Ulysses  arrangement  involves  forcing  
medication   on   a   patient   pursuant   to   her   advance   request,  
procedural  protections  are  necessary.577    Proposed  Part  VI  of  the  
generic   directive   statute   should   set   forth   the   following  
safeguards   for   administering  medication  pursuant   to   a  Ulysses  
arrangement.      First,   if   a  patient  with  a  Ulysses  arrangement  —
consenting   to   psychiatric   medication  —refuses   through   words  
or  actions  such  medication  in  the  midst  of  an  episode,  then  only  
a   licensed   psychiatrist   may   administer   the   medication.   The  
following   circumstances   must   be   present:   (1)   the   patient  
expressly   consented   to   psychiatric   medication   in   her   Ulysses  
arrangement;  (2)  the  surrogate,  if  one  was  designated,  consented  
to   the   medication;   and   (3)   two   licensed   psychiatrists  
recommend,   in  writing,   treatment  with   the   specific   psychiatric  
medication.  
This  process  strikes  the  right  balance  between  safeguarding  
against   abuse   and   empowering  patients   to   secure   intervention.    
The   requirement   that   multiple   psychiatrists   recommend   in  
writing   the   medication   protects   patient   safety   and   health   and  
prevents  fraud  and  coercion.578    Malpractice  is  less  likely  to  occur  
when   two   licensed   psychiatrists   approve   in   writing   the  
medication,   as   opposed   to  one  physician  who   is  not   a   licensed  
psychiatrist.579      The   requirement   that   two   psychiatrists  
recommend   the  medication   in  writing   prevents   administration  
of   medication   that   is   unnecessary,   and   therefore   safeguards  
against   fraud.      The   requirement   protects   the   patient   from   the  
coercive   use   of   the   Ulysses   arrangement   by   a   physician   who  
wants   to   force   a   treatment   regimen   on   a   patient.580      The  
requirement   for   written   consent   from   the   surrogate   before  
administering   medication   also   safeguards   against   fraud   and  
 
   577.     Advance  Directive  Instruments,  supra  note  212,  at  87-­‐‑88.  
   578.     Clausen,  supra  note  1  at  56-­‐‑8    
   579.     Id.    
   580.     Advance  Directive  Instruments,  supra  note  212,  at  87-­‐‑88.  
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abuse.      The   surrogate   is   the   patient’s   chosen   decision-­‐‑maker  
responsible   for   implementing   the   patient’s   instructions.581    
Finally,   the   prohibition   against   administering   medication  
pursuant  to  a  Ulysses  arrangement,  unless  the  patient  expressly  
consented   to  such  medication,  helps  ensure  medication   is  what  
the  patient  truly  wanted.  
Finally,   in   Florida,   physicians   initiate   almost   half   of   all  
involuntary  examinations  under  the  Baker  Act  by  execution  of  a  
certificate   initiating   such   examinations.582      Of   course,   these  
certificates  do  not  contemplate  evaluation,  admission,  retention,  
and   treatment   administered   pursuant   to   a   Ulysses  
arrangement.583     Therefore,   the  Florida   legislature  should  create  
certificates   to   be   executed   by   physicians   who   evaluate,   admit,  
retain,  and  treat  patients  pursuant  to  Ulysses  arrangements.    The  
forms   should   reflect   all   of   the   requirements   concerning  
evaluation,  admission,  retention,  and  treatment  specified  above.  
CONCLUSION  
Florida   should   amend   the   Florida   generic  directive   statute  
and   the   Baker  Act   to   empower  mental   health   patients   to   form  
and   effectuate   Ulysses   arrangements.584      Such   arrangements  
empower   people   to   obtain   intervention   when   an   episode   has  
caused   treatment   refusals.585      The   current   combination   of  
Florida’s   involuntary   examination   criteria   and   failure   to  
authorize  Ulysses  arrangements  postpones  intervention  so  as  to  
endanger  the  health  and  safety  of  the  patient  and  others.586  The  
 
   581.     Nat’l  Conference  of  Comm’rs  on  Unif.  State  Laws,  Uniform  Health-­‐‑Care  
Decisions  Act,  UNIFORM  L.  COMMISSION  22  (Jan.  12,  1994),  
http//www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/health%20care%20decisions/uhcda_final_
93.pdf  [hereinafter  UHCDA].  
   582.     DCF  Fact  Sheet,  supra  note  4.  
   583.   By  Authority  of  FLA.  STAT.  §§  394.455(18),  394.463(2)(a)(3),  394.4655(2)(a)(1),  
394.467(1)-­‐‑(2)  (2013).  
   584.     FLA.  STAT.,  ch.  765  (2013);  see  supra  pp.  146-­‐‑162.  
   585.     Clausen,  supra  note  1  at  4.    
   586.     FLA.  STAT.,  ch.  765  (2013);  see  supra  pp.  146-­‐‑162.  
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Ulysses  arrangement  offers  hope  of  preventing  such  tragedies  as  
James   Tuten’s   suicide,   which   occurred   the   day   after   his  
psychiatrist   heeded   his   discharge   demands   because   James   no  
longer   technically   met   involuntary   placement   criteria.587      For  
many  patients,  Ulysses  arrangement  intervention  is  preferable  to  
involuntary   placement   because   Ulysses   arrangement  
intervention  is  both  more  timely,  effective,  therapeutic,  and  less  
traumatic,   intrusive,   and   time-­‐‑consuming.588      For   Florida,  
Ulysses   arrangement   intervention   preserves   scarce   judicial,  
public  defender,  medical,  and  hospital  resources.589  
Proposed  Part  VI  of   the  generic  directive   statute  described  
in   this   Article   ensures   patients   form   arrangements   voluntarily  
and  knowingly  because  it  empowers  patients  to  decide  whether  
they   can   revoke   their   directives   when   they   lack   capacity.      It  
requires  a  signed,  witnessed  writing  and  a  capacity  assessment  
and   attestation   at   the   time   of   arrangement   formation.      These  
measures   help   prevent   fraud,   undue   influence,   coercion,   and  
duress.      Moreover,   proposed   Part   VI   of   the   generic   directive  
statute   provides   for   automatic   expiration,   which   helps   ensure  
informed  consent  is  relatively  recent.  
The  summarized  legislative  relief  also  empowers  patients  to  
make   their   arrangements   effective   intervention   tools   by  
authorizing   patient   designated   activation   and   involuntary  
transportation   to   a   facility.      The   involuntary   transportation  
option   is   novel   and   necessary.     A   patient  whose   illness   causes  
treatment   refusals  will   also   refuse   transportation   to   a   hospital.    
Requirements  for  a  surrogate  affidavit,  petition,  and  court  order  
to  authorize  involuntary  transportation  help  ensure  involuntary  
transportation  is  what  the  patient  decided  she  needs  and  wants,  
and  helps  safeguard  against  abuse.  
Proposed   Part   VI   of   the   generic   directive   statute   also   sets  
forth   procedures   for   admission,   retention,   and   treatment   over  
 
   587.     Tuten  v.  Fariborzian,  84  So.3d  1063,  1065  (Fla.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  2012).  
   588.     See  supra  Part  I(B)(2).  
   589.     See  id.  
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contemporaneous   objections,   which   safeguard   against   abuse.    
The   described   provision   provides   a   rebuttable   presumption   of  
incapacity  in  the  event  a  patient’s  Ulysses  arrangement  consents  
to  treatment  the  patient  then  refuses  in  the  midst  of  an  episode.    
This  presumption   is  necessary   to   facilitate   treatment  because   it  
recognizes   Florida   doctors,   concerned   about   liability   for  
hospitalizing   and   treating   a   patient   who   does   not   meet   Baker  




   590.     FLA.  STAT.  §  394.463(1)  (2013).  
